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Michael S. Lewis 
Evil History: Protecting Our Constitution Through an 
Anti-Originalism Canon of Constitutional Interpretation 
18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 261 (2020) 
A B S T R A C T .  This review assesses three recent books on the subject of originalism. Each 
approaches the question of originalism from a different angle. None of the books confronts the 
raw challenge to the authority of the framers leveled by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his speech 
upon the bicentennial of the United States Constitution. Marshall argued that the founding 
generation was too morally compromised, too bereft of information we now have as a result of 
the existence and experiences of millions of Americans since the close of the 18th century, and too 
imperfect in their efforts to design a sustainable government, to justify the devotion to their 
perspective originalism demands. In the face of this critique, originalism, which is a devotional 
doctrine, and originalists, its devotees, nevertheless insist that we should obey the founding 
generation and ignore, among other things, the "the reality that a nation putatively based on the 
principle of human equality was actually a prison house in which millions of Americans had 
virtually no rights at all."  This review demands that advocates for an originalist methodology 
confront the full brunt of our past, both good and evil, in promoting their interpretative approach. 
The failure to do so has deep moral, political, sociological and legal ramifications. "Law writes the 
past, not just its own past, but the past for those over whom law seeks to exercise its dominion." 
To the extent that law writes a past that covers-up, papers-over, ignores or subverts the evil aspects 
of history, it engages in abuses that we would condemn if perpetrated by other nations as denial. 
As a methodology, this review rejects originalism as a presumptively justifiable methodology. 
It goes further. It proposes a canon of constitutional construction that would proscribe the use of 
originalism in any of its variants unless certain prophylactic historical facts are established or 
negated by the proponents of any form of originalism. Broadly speaking, this canon would require 
any party in any litigation or legal dispute seeking to offer or rely upon the perspective of the 
founding generation in any dispositive fashion to demonstrate that the clause or clauses to be 
interpreted and the history to be deployed bears no supporting relationship to the evils of our 
national past and would not further principles underlying those evils.  Specifically, such a canon 
would require proponents of the originalism methodology to demonstrate that, before adopting 
originalism as a method to resolve a case,  such an interpretation would not support or extend 
original principles that perpetuated the institution of slavery, supported the expulsion and mass 
extermination of Native Americans as a national policy, buttressed the terrorism of Redemption 
upon the collapse of Reconstruction, entrenched the political and personal subjugation of women 
®
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and children, or permitted the use of governmental force to suppress political speech in the forms 
present during any of the historical periods from which the evidence is drawn. If the proponents 
of originalism are not able to overcome this burden, the canon would require that they rely upon 
the many methodological approaches to constitutional interpretation that are not originalism, 
that have developed over the course of American history, and have been embraced and 
incorporated into our law as a matter of historical practice. 
A U T H O R .   Michael S. Lewis, B.A., Kenyon College, 2000, J.D. UC Berkeley 2004, is a shareholder 
at Rath, Young and Pignatelli, P.C. and an adjunct professor of law at the University of New 
Hampshire School of Law.   He is a former Assistant Attorney General at the New Hampshire 
Department of Justice where he served as a homicide prosecutor.   This review is dedicated to the 
memory of Professor Philip P. Frickey, a wonderful teacher and writer.  The connections between 
this article and Professor Frickey’s work are manifest and demonstrate how deeply he influenced 
at least one of his students.  Special thanks to Professor David Plunkett, Dartmouth College, a 
lovely mentor for a lawyer concerned with philosophy and sound argument.  Special thanks to 
Professors Charles Barzun at the UVA Law, Fred Baumann of Kenyon College, Jessica Bulman-
Pozen of Columbia Law, Blake Emerson at UCLA Law, and Jean Galbraith at UPenn Law, for 
providing helpful comments and suggestions, and to Hon. Jeffrey Sutton, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and Hon. Joseph LaPlante and Hon. Paul 
Barbadoro, United States District Court, District of New Hampshire, for their continued, 
thoughtful dialogue on these issues.  Thank you to Professor William Baude of University of 
Chicago Law School for forwarding his recent writing on constitutional “liquidation” and to 
President Paul Finkelman of Graetz College for providing papers on the entrenchment of slavery 
during the founding and through the Constitution.  These articles are cited below.  
Encouragement and comments from Elliott Berry, Sarah Mattson Dustin, Maggie Goodlander, 
Keenan Kmiec, Mike Perez, Leah Plunkett, Rabbi Robin Nafshi, Kevin Scura, and Abraham 
Sutherland helped get me through worries that this review stands in relation to rebelling stanzas 
from Paradise Lost.   This review can be cited as Michael S. Lewis, Evil History: Protecting Our 
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Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the Framers particularly 
profound.  To the contrary, the government they devised was defective from the start, requiring 
several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of 
constitutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights, we hold 
as fundamental today.1 
         Justice Thurgood Marshall (May 6, 1987) 
I NT R ODUC T I ON 2 
The methodology called “originalism” appears to be more ascendant now than 
ever before.3  It would demand obedience to the original public meaning of today’s 
Constitution drawn from the understanding and interpretation of the generation 
that ratified the Constitution of 1789.4  It would do so despite the passage of so many 
 
1  Hon. Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. Justice, U.S., Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San 
Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association: The Bicentennial Speech (May 6, 1987), 
http://thurgoodmarshall.com/the-bicentennial-speech/ [https://perma.cc/T7YB-E2BN]. 
2  A brief word about citations: This review is heavily footnoted on purpose.  It is so because it 
takes a controversial position regarding a revered perspective.  But more importantly, it cites to 
many sources of history to demonstrate the availability of information that should be considered 
by those who seek to defend or critique the use of history in the construction and application of 
federal constitutional law.   
3  See, e.g., Neil Gorsuch, A Republic If You Can Keep It 10 (2019) (“For me, respect for the 
separation of powers implies originalism in the application of the Constitution and textualism in 
the interpretation of statues.”); Bucklew v. Precyth, 587 U.S. ___, slip op. at 6 (April 1, 2019) (“The 
Constitution allows capital punishment . . . In fact, death was the standard penalty for all serious 
crimes at the time of the founding.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Ilan 
Wurman, Originalism’s New Critics, Part 1: Fixing Fixity, Claremont Rev. of Books (Jan. 16, 2019),  
https://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/originalisms-new-critics-part-1-fixing-fixity/ 
[https://perma.cc/4TXR-8FA8] (“Brett Kavanaugh’s ascension to the United States Supreme Court 
is sure to thrust originalism center stage in the debates over constitutional interpretation.”); 
Symposium, A Dialogue with Federal Judges on the Role of History in Interpretation, 80 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 1889, 1912 (2011) (“JUDGE KAVANAUGH:  I think on the history—and when I say history, 
we’re talking about what happened in the summer of 1787 as well as the English history, where it 
came from and also going into the ratification debates, to try to figure out what the words 
meant.”). 
4  The “Constitution of 1789” is the document that went into effect in March 1789, after it was 
ratified by New Hampshire, the ninth and definite state, on June 21, 1788, after the constitutional 
convention approved it through delegates from the states on September 17, 1787.  On September 
25, 1789, Congress adopted the Bill of Rights and sent them to the nation for ratification.  
Ratification of ten of the amendments occurred at the end of 1791.  See NCC Staff, The Day the 
Constitution was Ratified, Nat’l Const. Ctr.: Const. Daily (June 21, 2019), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-day-the-constitution-was-ratified [https://perma.cc/
2V77-MWZ3].  Some refer to the Constitution of 1789 as the Constitution of 1787.  See, e.g., Paul 
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years and the great changes to the Constitution  that have occurred in the 
intervening period.5   
If deployed to its greatest effect, originalism would undo decades of standing 
constitutional law, law that Americans have come to view as bedrock to our national 
identity.6  The implications have caused a number of scholars to give attention to 
 
Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 Akron 
L. Rev. 423, 424 (1999) (“The Constitution of 1787 was a proslavery document, designed to prevent 
any national assault on slavery, while at the same time structured to protect the interests of 
slaveowners at the expense of African Americans and their antislavery white allies.”).  For a review 
of the timeline and content of the ratification debates, see Pauline Maier, Ratification: The 
People Debate the Constitution 1787-1788 (2010) (“The drama formally began on September 
17, 1787, when the Constitutional Convention . . . adjourned and released to the public the 
Constitution it had written in secrecy.”).  Two scholars claim that the United States Constitution 
is the same as it was in 1789.  See Evan D. Bernick & Christopher R. Green, What is the Object of the 
Article VI Oath?, (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3441234 [https://perma.cc/D2VD-XRMC] (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“Our 
thesis here takes an additional step: when officers . . . use the term “the Constitution in relation 
to the job for which the Article VI oath was a condition, they refer to the same entity that the Founders 
did when they constructed the republic.  Our Constitution is the same as their Constitution.”).  
This point seems obviously wrong and ignores all of the amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
5  See infra note 6; the definition of “originalism” is quite variously described.  See John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution 3–10 (2013) 
(describing variants of “originalism” as well as deficits in justifications of the methodology); 
Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 7, 18 
(2006) (“The principle that the meaning of the Constitution shall remain the same until it is 
properly changed is simply another way of describing original public meaning.”) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L. J. 657, 662–63 (2009) 
(describing originalism as an “inconsistent term” subject to inconsistent and sometimes 
unintelligible descriptions of it, including by its primary advocates).  At least one scholar has 
pointed out the difficulty of discovering and determining the mechanism for constitutional 
change set forth by constitutional text.  See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint 9–10 
(2019).  The same scholar notes that the Constitution of 1787 came to existence by means that 
violated an earlier, more restrictive, textual limitation on constitutional change.   See id. at 11–18. 
6   See Lee J. Strang, Originalism’s Promise 9 (2019) (acknowledging that nonoriginalist 
methodologies have dominated American federal jurisprudence for most of the 20th century) 
(2019); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1 (“How can an originalist jurisprudence address 
the hundreds of judicial decisions inconsistent with original meaning that are now deemed the 
law of the land?”).  Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 432 (1997) (arguing that 
originalism would repudiate Brown v. Board of Education); but see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Originalism and Precedent, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 122 (2010) (arguing to the 
contrary).  See also J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Legal Canons 35–36 (2000) (citing a 
“list” of canonical decisions in the area of constitution law, some of which remain law).  In part, 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 2  ( 2 0 2 0 )  
266 
originalism in book-length publications.  This review assesses three recent books on 
the subject.   
Each of the three books under review approaches originalism from a different 
angle.  None confronts the raw challenge to the authority of the founding 
generation leveled by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his speech upon the bicentennial 
of the United States Constitution.  Marshall argued that the founding generation 
was too morally compromised, too bereft of information we now have as a result of 
the existence and experiences of millions of Americans since the 18th century, and 
too imperfect in its efforts to design a sustainable government, to justify the 
devotion to its perspective originalism demands.  In the face of this critique, 
originalism, which is a devotional doctrine,7  and originalists, its devotees, insist 
that we should obey the founding generation and ignore a great deal about our past, 
including “the reality that a nation putatively based on the principle of human 
equality was actually a prison house in which millions of Americans had virtually no 
rights at all.”8 
Drawing on this and other more complete descriptions of our history, this 
review demands that advocates for an originalist methodology confront the full 
brunt of our past, both good and evil.  Very few do.  The failure to do so has deep 
moral, political, sociological, and legal ramifications.9  “Law writes the past, not just 
 
this depends upon the generality of the “originalist perspective.”  See Peter J. Smith, Originalism 
and Level of Generality, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 485, 487 (2017) (“Did the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment understand it to prohibit laws interfering with a woman’s right to use birth control 
or to obtain an abortion?  Almost certainly not.  But would a hypothetical reasonable, well-
informed person in 1868 have understood the Fourteenth Amendment to offer protection in 
matters of family and child rearing?  Likely so.”) (offering no citation for either supposition). 
7  Cf. John Gardner, Law as Leap of Faith, in Law as Leap of Faith 11–12 (2012) (“By virtue of 
the Grundnorm, their authorization entails their rightness and their rightness entails their 
authorization.”); Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity: “Original” Meaning Is Not Objective, 26 
Const. Comment. 1, 1 (2009) (“Don’t we have to be faithful to what the lawmakers were doing?”); 
see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 
Fordham L. Rev. 545, 548 (2006) (“During the Reagan Presidency . . . ‘originalism’ emerged as a  
new and powerful kind of constitutional politics in which claims about the sole legitimate method 
of interpreting the Constitution inspired conservative mobilization in both electoral politics and 
in the legal profession.”). 
8  Andrew Delbanco, The War Before the War 2 (2018).   
9  Susan Nieman, Learning from the Germans, Race and the Memory of Evil 37 (2019) 
(“Seen in another [light], what’s clear is what the similarities [between German and American 
racist histories] can teach us about guilt and atonement, memory and oblivion, and the presence 
of past in preparing for the future. . . . When pasts fester, they become open wounds.”).  
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its own past, but the past for those over whom law seeks to exercise its dominion.”10  
To the extent that law writes a past that covers-up, papers-over,11 ignores, or 
subverts the evil  aspects of history,12 it engages in abuses that we would condemn 
if perpetrated by other nations.  We would call it denial.13  This review requires us to 
remember, and not forget, our history when using history to provide content to our 
law.14  It describes originalism as taking the contrary perspective.  It maintains that 
 
10  Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Writing History and Registering Memory in Legal Decisions 
and Legal Practices: An Introduction, in History, Memory and the Law 3 (2002 ed.) (footnote 
omitted); see also Jesse Green, Review: Can a Play Make the Constitution Great Again, N.Y. Times (Mar. 
31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/theater/what-the-constitution-means-to-me-
review.html [https://perma.cc/TX68-DB6Z] (reviewing a play that suggested to the reviewer: “If 
you are not a white, male landowner as envisioned by the founding fathers, the Constitution has 
little to offer you.”). 
11  Cf. Gillian Brockwell, George Washington Owned Slaves and Ordered Indians Killed.  Will a Mural 
of that History be Hidden?, Wash. Post (Aug. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/history/2019/08/25/george-washington-owned-slaves-ordered-indians-killed-will-
mural-that-history-be-hidden/ [https://perma.cc/Q85N-UD4R] (describing debate over whether 
to cover over an artistic depiction of George Washington’s racist and racial, violent, brutality, two 
murals “depicting the great injustices of early American history: slavery and the genocide and 
dispossession of the first people.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
12  “Evil” is used here, at least, in the sense it was used by Hannah Arendt in her assessment of 
the evil perpetrated by Nazi bureaucrats.  See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem:  A 
Report on the Banality of Evil 287–88 (2006 ed.) (describing the normalcy and 
thoughtlessness of the most destructive evil-doers); see also The Concept of Evil, Stan. 
Encyclopedia of Phil. (2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concept-evil/ [https://perma.cc
/Y8TG-SK6F] (last visited Aug. 20, 2019) (surveying “The Concept of Evil” and noting Arendt’s 
observations about how the greatest criminals may be totally normal and commit great evil 
through incredible, self-serving, thoughtlessness).  Constitutional scholars have used the word 
“evil” to describe our constitutional past.  Jack Balkin, Constitutional Redemption 7 (2011) 
(“Two problems haunt us and threaten our constitutional faith.  The first is the problem of 
constitutional evil.”).    
13  Michael S. Lewis, Confronting a Monument: The Great Chief Justice in an Age of Historical 
Reckoning, 17 U.N.H. L. Rev. 315, 337 (2019) (quoting speech by the late-Justice Scalia on the 
importance of memory as a means to prevent catastrophe); see also Ibram X. Kendi, How to be 
an Antiracist 9 (2019) (“Denial is the heartbeat of racism, beating across ideologies, and nations.  
It is beating within us.”); Bronwyn Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored Violence, Imagining 
Political Change 1 (2011) (“In recent decades, institutions designed to recover such stories, and 
to challenge efforts to consign evidence of past atrocities to ‘holes of oblivion,’ have proliferated 
to numerous countries around the world . . . An International Criminal Court has been developed 
to hold individuals accountable for egregious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.”). 
14  See Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought 66 (2002) (“Rousseau also pointed out that 
such doctrines [the denial of evil] lead to quietism.  If evils are merely apparent, and everything is 
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originalism engages in a methodology that undermines a central feature of 
litigation under our rule of law: the goal of finding truth through processes that seek 
to advance accurate findings of fact.15   Stepping back even further, this review takes 
the position that the effects of deploying originalism in this manner would threaten 
to entrench, as a defining genetic feature of our constitutional law, a poisoned 
strain drawn from a poisoned history that would weaken, rather than strengthen, 
the moral, political, and legal standing of our constitutional law.16   
To inoculate17 our law against this threat, and, relatedly, to facilitate truthful 
results in litigation in the face of remarkable inertia to the contrary,18 this review 
 
the best that it could be, there’s no need to do anything about them.  Indeed, any action might 
count as impious—as many authorities used traditional theodicy to argue.”); see, e.g., Reva B. 
Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. 
L. Rev. 947, 949 (2002) (“Even though the quest for the vote spanned generations and provoked 
the most sustained dialogue about women’s position in the constitutional community that the 
nation has ever conducted, the Nineteenth Amendment has been utterly excluded from the 
constitutional canon.”). 
15  See Sarat & Kearns, supra note 10, at 11 (“The sole question with which the law should 
concern itself is whether, according to the evidence presented and the rules of proof, someone 
‘did’ what they were accused of doing or some event did or did not happen.”). 
16  See Charles L. Barzun, Of Origins and Arguments: The Genetic Fallacy and the Idea of Progress 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that historical genealogy is a legitimate 
concern within American law); see also Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor:  Why the 
Constitution is a “Suicide Pact”, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 287, 290 (2011) (“To be a legitimate 
constitution—to actually be worth of such communal sacrifice—the given constitution must be 
moral; that is, both designed to enforce and actually capable of enforcing the abiding moral duties 
that demarcate legitimate from illegitimate government.”); see also James W. Loewen, Lies My 
Teacher Told Me xix-xx (3d ed. 2018) (“[T]here is a reciprocal relationship between truth about 
the past and justice in the present.  When we achieve justice in the present, remedying some past 
event or practice, then we can face it and talk about it more openly, precisely because we have 
made it right.”). 
17  Cf. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in On Liberty and the Subjection of 
Women 140 (6th ed., Penguin Books 2006) (1879) (“History gives a cruel experience of human 
nature, in shewing exactly the regard due to life, possessions and entire earthly happiness of any 
class of persons, was measured by what they had the power of enforcing; how all who made any 
resistance to authorities that had arms in their hands, however dreadful might be the provocation, 
had not only the law of force but all other laws, and all notions of social obligation against them; 
and in the eyes of those whom they resisted, were not only guilty of crime, but the worst of all 
crimes, deserving the most cruel chastisement which human beings could inflict.”). 
18  See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 14, at 949 (“Today, the sex discrimination paradigm remains 
limited, in constitutional legitimacy and critical acuity, by the ahistorical manner in which the 
Court derived it from the law of race discrimination.”); see Gerda Lerner, Why History 
Matters 205 (1997) (“Selective memory on the part of the men who recorded and interpreted 
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proposes an approach to constitutional interpretation that acknowledges the evils 
perpetrated by the founding generation, the limited and flawed perspective of that 
generation, and the great advances in numerous fields of human understanding 
that we have accomplished since the founding.  It argues that this history and these 
developments should inform the construction of our fundamental laws.  It further 
argues that developments in our understanding of history and justice should cause 
us to deploy an interpretive methodology within the domain of federal 
constitutional law that, at least, opposes interpretive methodologies like 
originalism if originalism would entrench the evil perspectives of evildoers who 
engaged in great evil during evil times.19  It would permit history to be used as a 
basis for giving content to our law only to the extent that history reflects the better 
angels of our nature.20 
As a methodology, this review rejects originalism as a presumptively justifiable 
methodology.  It goes further.21  It proposes a canon of constitutional construction 
that would proscribe the use of originalism, in any of its variants, unless certain 
prophylactic historical facts are established, or negated, by the proponents of any 
form of originalism.  Broadly speaking, this canon would require any party in any 
litigation or legal dispute seeking to offer or rely upon the exclusive perspective of 
the founding generation in any dispositive fashion to overcome a prophylactic 
burden.  Such a party would be required to demonstrate that the history to be 
deployed in that effort bears no supporting relationship to the evils of our national 
past and would not further principles that underlie those evils.   
 
history has had a devastating impact on women.”). 
19  Cf. INGO Muller, Hitler’s Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich xvi (1991) (describing 
canons of construction imposed upon German law by the Allies after the fall of the Nazi regime 
that foreclosed reliance upon Nazi interpretations of law in the Post-War world). 
20  See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln (March 4, 1861), 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp [https://perma.cc/TT5A-29N7] (“The mystic 
chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and 
hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, 
as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.”); see also Nieman, supra note 9, at 39 (“An 
open reckoning with the past is a crucial step toward maturity that will allow us to envision a full-
bodied future, for a grown-up relationship to one’s culture is like a grown-up relationship to your 
parents . . . Growing up involves sifting through all the things you couldn’t help inheriting and 
figuring out what you want to claim as your own—and what you have to do to dispose of the rest 
of it.”). 
21  In this respect, the proposal contained in this article is a substantial departure from all 
schools of thought on the issue.  See Daniel Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide to the Perplexed, 
49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085, 1086 (1989) (“Almost no one believes that the original understanding is wholly 
irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation”).   
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Such evils include the institution of slavery,22  the expulsion and mass 
extermination of Native Americans as a national policy,23 the terrorism of 
Redemption upon the collapse of Reconstruction,24  the political and personal 
 
22  Cf. Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34 Akron L. Rev. 261, 261 
(2000) (“Finally, slavery shaped many of the key decisions of the 19th century and led to the creation 
of doctrine that continues to affect modern Constitutional law today.”). 
23  See Jeffrey Ostler, Surviving Genocide 4 (2019) (“But, as this book will show, U.S. 
Officials developed a policy that ‘wars of extermination’ against resisting Indians were not only 
necessary but ethical and legal.”). 
24  See Stephen Budiansky, The Bloody Shirt:  Terror After the Civil War 1 (2009) (“The 
title of this book refers to a small footnote in the brutal war of terrorist violence that was waged 
in the American South in the years immediately following the Civil War.  The terror began almost 
as soon as the Civil War ended in 1865; it lasted until 1876, when the last of the governments of the 
Southern states freely elected through universal manhood suffrage was toppled in a well-
orchestrated campaign of violence, fraud, and intimidation—thereby putting an end to 
Reconstruction, erasing the freedmen’s newly won political rights, and securing white 
conservative home rule to the South for a hundred years to come.”); see also Henry Louis Gates, 
Jr., Stony the Road:  Reconstruction, White Supremacy and the Rise of Jim Crow 9–10 
(2018) (describing the Southern assault on Reconstruction); see also Michael W. McConnell, The 
Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 Const. Comment. 115, 122–133 (1994) (describing this phase in 
history). 
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subjugation of women25 and children by law,26 or the use of governmental force to 
suppress political speech in the forms present during any of the historical periods 
from which the evidence is drawn.27  If the proponents of originalism are not able 
to overcome this burden, they must rely upon the many methodological approaches 
 
25  Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for 
Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871, 872 (1971) (“Historically, the subordinate status of women has been firmly 
entrenched in our legal system.  At common law women were conceded few rights.  Constitutions 
were drafted on the assumption that women did not exist as legal persons.  Courts classified 
women with children and imbeciles, denying their capacity to think and act as responsible adults 
and enclosing them in the bonds of protective personalism.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual 
Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 Wash. U. L. Q. 161, 162–63 (1979) 
(“When the post-Civil War amendments were added to the Constitution, women were not 
accorded the vote, the right now regarded by the Supreme Court as most basic to adult citizenship.  
Married women in many states could not contract, hold property, litigate on their own behalf, or 
even control their own earnings.  The fourteenth amendment left all that untouched.  To the 
nineteenth century jurist, change in women’s status, alteration of laws restricting a woman’s 
options, was state business, not fit for federal statutory or constitutional resolution.”); see also 
Mary Anne Franks, The Cult of the Constitution 29 (2019) (“While the framers engaged in 
exhaustive debate over the most effective means of checking governmental tyranny, they made 
no effort to address the unchecked power of men over women.  The founders were apparently 
untroubled by the contradiction, expressed so patiently by Abigail [Adams], that ‘whilst you are 
proclaiming peace and good will to Men, Emancipating all Nations, you insist in retaining 
absolute power over Wives.’”) (footnote and citation omitted). 
26  See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Courage of Innocence: Children as Heroes in the Struggle for 
Justice, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1567, 1569–71 (2009) (describing slavery and conditions of slavery in 
which children lived in early America); Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 Yale 
Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1, 12 (2004) (describing U.S. Supreme Court case law establishing a “parental 
property interest in children” and as “objects” akin to a “form or private property”); see also David 
Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (1993), in Leslie J. Harris and Lee E. Teitelbaum, 
Children, Parents and the Law 9 (2d ed. 2006) (describing views supporting the notion that 
children are owned by their parents); Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A 
Reappraisal of the State’s Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 68 Geo. L.J. 887, 902 (1975) (describing 
practices permitting indentured servitude of children in colonial America and through the 
ratification period). 
27  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times 5 (2004) (“In such an atmosphere [the environment 
of war], the line between dissent and disloyalty is elusive, and often ignored.  As we shall see, the 
United States has a long and unfortunate history of overreacting to the perceived dangers of 
wartime.  Time and again, Americans have allowed fear and fury to get the better of them.  Time 
and again, Americans have suppressed dissent, imprisoned and deported dissenters, and then—
later—regretted their actions.”); Neil S. Siegel, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 93 GEO. L.J. 1645, 
1646–47 (2005) (“In six historical periods, Professor Stone finds that the federal government and 
the citizenry overreacted, needlessly sacrificing civil liberties at the altar of perceived threatens to 
national security” including at the earliest stages of our history through the Sedition Act of 1798). 
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to constitutional interpretation that are not originalism that have been developed, 
embraced, and incorporated into our law over the course of American history.28 
For the purpose of framing this proposal, Part I describes each of the books 
under review.  Professor Ilan Wurman advertises his A Debt Against the Living as an 
effort to sell originalism to a broad audience.29  I address the book on its own terms 
because it engages in the project of mass appeal.  Professor Eric J. Segall’s 
Originalism as Faith (published by the same publisher) presents the counter-
perspective, surveying the history of originalism, evidence that originalism is not a 
methodology with substantial legal roots in American law, and the ways in which 
originalism fails to attain its central aims.30  Professor Gienapp’s The Second Creation, 
a more standard history, demonstrates how a central premise of originalism, that 
the written text of the Constitution had the special status originalists afford it, is 
not supported by the historical record regarding views on the law in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.  Each book accepts the authority of the founding 
generation and deploys the perspective of the framers to support its arguments 
where Justice Marshall would not.  This review rejects that approach in favor of 
Justice Marshall’s perspective and constructs the first part of a methodology to 
implement his view. 
Part II begins this process by incorporating into the discussion about American 
history a stark, unvarnished description of the inhumanity of the founding 
generation.  It does so through an account of that generation’s toleration and 
 
28  See Strang, supra note 6, at 152 (“Large swaths of American constitutional law are populated 
or, in some instances, dominated by nonoriginalist precedent.”); see also Mitchell N. Berman, The 
Tragedy of Justice Scalia, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 783, 789 (2017) (“As I read him, [Justice] Harlan is painting 
a picture of constitutional norms changing in evolutionary fashion, in response to changes in our 
polity’s deep commitments.”) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
see also Noah Feldman, The Many Contradictions of Oliver Wendell Holmes, NY Times (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/books/review/oliver-wendell-holmes-stephen-
budiansky.html [https://perma.cc/7BRC-SHWZ] (describing Justice Holmes’ pragmatism); 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 Ind. L.J. 1183, 1188 (2012) (describing and 
comparing originalist and nonoriginalist approaches to interpretation). 
29  See Ilan Wurman, A Debt Against The Living: An Introduction To Originalism 3 (2017) 
(“This [book] aims to arm the reader with basing arguments about the legitimacy of our 
Constitution and our Founding, and to explain the relevance of these arguments to modern 
debates over constitutional interpretation . . . . It then argues that originalism . . . is the only 
method of constitutionally discharges this debt.  This book is a short introduction to, and defense 
of, originalism as the Founding”). 
30  See Eric J. Segall, Originalism as Faith 14 (2018) (“It is not in vague text or disputed 
historical accounts of the origins of that text, but in the justices’ characters, judgments, and 
values, that the American people must ultimately place their faith”). 
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promotion of slavery, the manner in which the founding generation protected and 
paved the way for its extension,31 and the ways in which the political society that 
grew out of that generation soiled our history with the stain of deep, violent, 
terroristic, racist and sexist inhumanity.32  It notes that the cruelty that arose from 
American legal racism served as an archetype for Nazi Germany and other 
dystopian societies.33  It forces an historical accounting of the founding generation’s 
duplicity toward Native Americans, leading to efforts to nearly exterminate an 
entire race of humans,34 and it describes how women and children were perceived 
 
31  See Mary Elliott and Jazmine Hughs, Four Hundred Years After Enslaved Africans Were First 
Brought to Virginia, Most Americans Still Don’t Know the Full Story of Slavery, N.Y. Times Mag. (Aug. 
19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/19/magazine/history-slavery-
smithsonian.html?auth=login-email [https://perma.cc/QG2E-5XNH] (“Yet the demand for a 
growing enslaved population to cultivate cotton in the Deep South was unyielding.  In 1808, 
Congress implemented the Act Prohibiting Important of Slaves, which terminated the country’s 
legal involvement in international slave trade but put new emphasis on the domestic slave trade, 
which relied on buying and selling enslaved black people already in the country, often separating 
them from their loved ones.  The ensuing forced migration of over a million African-Americans to 
the South guaranteed political power to the slaveholding class: The Three-Fifths Clause that the 
planter elite had secured in the Constitution held that three-fifths of the enslaved population was 
counted in determining a state’s population and thus its congressional representation.  The 
economic and political power grab reinforced the brutal system of slavery.”). 
32  See, e.g., Greene, supra note 5, at 659 (“And if democratic legitimacy is the measure of a sound 
constitutional interpretive practice, then Justice Scalia needs an account of why and how rote 
obedience to the commitments of voters two centuries distant and wildly racial, ethnic, sexual, 
and cultural composition can be justified on democratic grounds.”); Paul Finkelman, The 
Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 
371 (1989) (“By the time of the Revolution, slavery and racial discrimination were entrenched in 
America’s economic, social and legal structure.  This fact leads to some troublesome conclusions 
about the intentions of the framers of the Constitution.”).  Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings 
5 (1996) (“Precisely because the Constitution has always played a central role in American politics, 
law and political culture, as both a source of dispute and a legitimating symbol of national values, 
the interpretation of its historical origins and meaning has rarely if ever been divorced from an 
awareness of contemporary ramifications”).   
33  See James Q. Whitman, Hitler’s American Model 4 (2017) (“Awful it may be to 
contemplate, but the reality is that Nazis took a sustained, significant, and sometimes even eager 
interest in the American example of race law.”); see also Eric Foner, The Second Founding xxii-
xxiii (2019) (“Indeed, it [post-Reconstruction historical distortions] had a powerful impact beyond 
nation’s borders as a legitimization of colonial role over nonwhite people in far-flung places from 
South Africa to Australia.”) (footnote omitted). 
34  See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:  Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 427 (1993) (“The history of federal Indian 
law since Chief Justice Marshall has been filed with tragedy, a story in which the rule of law often 
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and treated as chattel and suffered as a result.35  Part II then defends the anti-
originalism canon of construction as a justified extension of current American law, 
which deploys canons of construction to achieve other substantive policy ends for 
the purpose of protecting the Constitution.    
At the heart of this review is the notion that our fundamental laws must be 
construed in a manner that, at least, blunts the perpetuation of evil and injustice of 
the sort we now so broadly condemn (slavery, dehumanizing sexism, the injury and 
abuse of children), and, at best, furthers the interests of justice in even more 
affirmative ways.36  In addressing originalism from this perspective, it therefore 
demands a true and complete historical reckoning.37   
A special note about the current moment is in order with regard to this project.  
The very remarkable style of the attack on historical truth that we are living through 
in the modern age provides a special environment in which to contest the claims set 
forth in this review.38  The canon I propose adopts the deeply principled and deeply 
 
has become a vehicle to rationalize what can only be understood as crimes against humanity.”) 
(footnote and citations omitted). 
35  See infra pp. 31–36. 
36  See Plato, The Republic, in The Republic of Plato (Allan Bloom trans., 2016 ed.) (“Then, my 
blessed Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice.”); see also Lerner, supra note 
18, at 205 (1997) (“The inability of the U.S. to come to terms with its complicity in slavery has made 
conflict over race a permanent feature of U.S. political life in the 20th century.”); Robert W. 
Gordon, The Struggle Over the Past, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123, 124 (1996) (describing how debates over 
the history of law drive approaches to the resolution of contemporaneous legal problems); see also 
Robert W. Gordon, Foreword:  The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 Stan.  L. Rev. 1023, 1023 (1996) 
(“After all, lawyers have recognized history for centuries and put it to work in argument, 
justification, and rationalization.  Most of the ways in which lawyers use history are, however, not 
‘critical’ in any plausible sense of the term.  For lawyers the past is primarily a source of authority—
if we interpret it correctly, it will tell us how to conduct ourselves now.”). 
37  See Lerner, supra note 18, at 203 (“Another aspect of the history of the powerful has been 
much under public scrutiny and needs to be considered here.  This concerns ‘forgetting the past’ 
and ‘selective remembering.’  After the Holocaust, after Vietnam, genocide in Cambodia, ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, whole nations, like individuals after trauma, take part in the 
great forgetting.”); Lewis, supra note 13, at 332 (“Moreover, the human need for comprehensive 
truth as a foundation for justice is as powerful an expression of the human personality as the 
desire to suppress truth to work injustice.”) (footnote and citations omitted). 
38  See, e.g., Gordon Brown, Forward to John Sexton, Standing for Reason:  The University 
in a Dogmatic Age ix (2019) (describing a “post-truth world where facts and assertion are 
equated, where the public’s confidence in the fundamental institutions of government and society 
is at an all-time low, and where we are witnessing, in an increasingly pervasive way, the 
devaluation of thought itself.”); cf. Simon Blackburn, On Truth 5 (2018) (“In 2016 the blithe 
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felt cry of “Never Again” in regard to American history.39  One reader of this article, 
my UNH Law School colleague Maggie Goodlander, has suggested that the canon 
could be called the “Never Again Canon.”  Such a canon would pit the demand for a 
just and complete historical reckoning against a perspective on our history that 
cries “Make America Great Again,”40 either negligently and without a true 
perspective regarding the implications of this view, or mendaciously against 
Americans in the hopes of reestablishing an evil social order that would deprive 
millions of cherished political and personal rights.41  The solution this review 
proposes would require that Americans exhibit the strength and courage sufficient 
to confront the extraordinarily painful aspects of our past as part of our desire to 
 
mendacity and sheer carelessness with facts indulged by politicians in Britain and America gave 
rise to the idea that we somehow live in a ‘post truth’ environment.”). 
39  See Danya Ruttenberg, ‘Never Again’ Means Nothing if Holocaust Analogies Are Always Off Limits, 
Wash. Post (June 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/19/never-again-
means-nothing-if-holocaust-analogies-are-always-off-limits/?utm_term=.9498a455c23f [https://
perma.cc/MK5J-6KUR] (explaining the importance of discussing historic atrocities and drawing 
analogies to present day, systemic, violence); see also Ariela Gross, When is the Time of Slavery?  The 
History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal and Political Argument, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 283, 286 (2008) 
(“Legal and political actors tell and re-tell these histories because they seek to persuade audiences 
of the moral force of their claims . . . . The way we tell the story of slavery and freedom matters to 
the arguments we make, and those arguments shape the histories we tell.”); Norman W. 
Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective 
Memory, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1992, 1998 (2003) (“For all their formal insulation from the demands 
of popular consciousness, it is primarily the courts that bear the explicit institutional burden of 
collective memory.”). 
40  Cf. Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DEN. U. L. REV. 517, 521 (2011) (“For me, as an 
African-American, a narrative of restoration is deeply alienating:  what America has been is hostile 
to my personhood and denies my membership in its political community.”) (emphasis added). 
41  See, e.g., Tim Hains, Bill Clinton: “If You’re a White Southerner,” You know What ‘Make America 
Great Again’ Really Means, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/09/07/bill_clinton_if_youre_a_white_southerner_
you_know_what_make_america_great_again_really_means.html [https://perma.cc/D67E-D7Z9] 
(“It means I’ll give you the economic you had 50 years ago and I’ll move you up the social totem 
pole and other people down.”); see also Kendi, supra note 13, at 8 (“When [Donald Trump] decided 
to run for President, his plan for making America great again: defaming Latinx immigrants as 
mostly criminals and rapists and demanding billions for a border wall to block them.  He promised 
‘a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.’  Once he became 
president, he routinely called his Black critics ‘stupid.’  He claimed immigrants from Haiti “all 
have AIDS,” while praising White supremacists as ‘very fine people’ in the summer of 2017.”). 
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protect a country we claim we love.42 
I .  A ME R I C AN HI S T OR Y  — AB R I DGE D ( I G NOR E D?  S UP P R E S S E D?  
E R AS E D? )  
Perhaps it was in response to the deep anxiety over attempts by our  
government officials to distort our history that, on July 4, 2019, citizens once again 
recited Frederick Douglass’s Speech: “What is the Slave to the Fourth of July.”43  The 
speech, a remarkable piece of literature, flips the fiction of our triumphalist 
American history on its head, using it as a foil to critique the dominant narrative of 
American history and to reassess our history from the perspective of its victims.44  
Recent writing on originalism, including the three books under review, has not 
incorporated this perspective into assessments of the methodology.  And so, in these 
three books, and in the general discussion about originalism cited within the 
endnotes of each book, there is no answer to Frederick Douglass’s charge in his July 
Fourth speech: 
Fellow-citizens; above your national tumultuous joy, I hear the mournful wail of 
millions! whose chains, heavy and grievous yesterday, are, to-day, rendered more 
intolerable by the jubilee shouts that reach them. . . . To forget them, to pass lightly over 
their wrongs, to chime in with the popular theme, would be treason most scandalous 
and shocking, and would make me a reproach before God and the world.   My subject, 
 
42  See Nieman, supra note 9, at 39 ([O]ur past will continue to haunt us if we do not face it 
down.”) (2019); see, e.g., Patti Davis, The Ronald Reagan who raised me would want forgiveness for his 
‘monkeys’ remark, Wash. Post (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
ronald-reagan-who-raised-me-would-want-forgiveness-for-his-monkeys-remark/2019/08/01/
c3c2b66c-b40c-11e9-951e-de024209545d_story.html?utm_term=.dd862a33eee1 [https://perma.cc/
5S5J-3NWX] (“But what I wasn’t prepared for was the tape of my father using the word ‘monkeys’ 
to describe black African delegates to the United Nations who has voted in a way that angered 
him. . . . There is no defense, no rationalization, no suitable explanation for what my father said 
on that taped phone conversation.”). 
43  Zoe Mathews, On Independence Day, People Will Recite Frederick Douglass’ Speech: ‘What Is the 
Slave to the Fourth of July?’  WGBH (July 1, 2019) https://www.wgbh.org/news/local-news/2019/
07/01/on-independence-day-people-will-recite-frederick-douglass-speech-what-is-the-slave-to-
the-fourth-of-july [https://perma.cc/V63A-V7EU] (“In recent years, alongside overt displays of 
patriotism, people have also begun convening to publicly read from abolitionist Frederick 
Douglass’s speech about the slave’s perspective of Independence Day, first delivered in 1852.”). 
44  See Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?, Teaching Am. Hist. (July 5, 
1852), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/what-to-the-slave-is-the-fourth-
of-july/ [https://perma.cc/J6YN-9DGB].  But see Foner, supra note 33, at 9 (describing Douglass’s 
shifting views on the constitution and his claim that slavery constituted a massive and perpetual 
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, a construction authorities would not and 
did not impose). 
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then fellow-citizens, is AMERICAN SLAVERY.45 
The first of the three books I review, A Debt Against the Living, by Ilan Wurman,46 
both proposes and promotes originalism without giving any sense that it is aware 
of what Douglass and many others have told us about American history.  A Debt is 
pitched as “An Introduction to Originalism,” whose definition of the originalism 
methodology is so clearly and transparently stated that it provides the greatest 
platform by which to level a critique against the approach.47  Professor Ilan 
Wurman, an attorney and constitutional law scholar at Arizona State University,48 
claims that his conception of originalism is the best form of constitutional 
interpretation.49  He defines originalism as follows: 
Originalism is quite a commonsensical idea, after all.  It has many flavors, but we can 
define it broadly as the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted as its words 
were originally understood by the Framers who wrote the Constitution in 1787 and by 
the public that ratified it between 1787 and 1789.50   
The defenses he proposes for originalism are fairly typical.51  They include the 
following arguments: that originalism is the only theory consistent with a 
democratic constitution because it renders official only the views of the citizens 
who made the law “the law” through the ratification process set forth in the 
Constitution;52 that originalism is consistent with the written nature of the 
Constitution, a special feature of the Constitution that establishes its permanency 
 
45  Id.  See also David W. Blight, Frederick Douglass 6–7 (2018) (Describing Douglass’s 
speech upon the dedication of a monument to President Lincoln, which included a “litany of 
Lincoln’s sins against the cause of abolition.”). 
46  See Wurman, supra note 29.  Ilan Wurman is a constitutional law scholar at Arizona State 
University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.  Ilan Wurman, https://isearch.asu.edu/profile/
3325418 [https://perma.cc/5PDN-3K6X] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).  He has also worked for 
conservative jurists and members of Congress.   
47  Cf. Strang, supra note 6, at 10 (collecting the remarkable, emerging variance among 
originalism’s proponents regarding the definition of originalism). 
48  See Wurman, supra note 29; Ilan Wurman, https://isearch.asu.edu/profile/3325418 
[https://perma.cc/5PDN-3K6X] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019). 
49  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 6 (“We will thus have answered both questions in our inquiry.  
We can conclude that we must be originalists because the nature of language and our legal system 
require it, and that the original Constitution is legitimate and worthy of our obedience because 
we like what it says.”). 
50  Id. at 11. 
51  Cf. Lawrence Solum and Robert W. Bennett, Constitutional Originalism 38, 40 
(2011). 
52  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 21. 
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as a fixed series of laws;53 that the framers were originalists, proof for which he 
provides by relying upon statements from James Madison and from the Federalist 
Papers;54 and that originalism is better than other theories of constitutional 
interpretation which fail to cabin otherwise unfettered judicial policy-making 
discretion.55 
In waging this defense, A Debt Against the Living exhibits the same remarkable 
feature of thinking that it shares with the most dedicated proponents of 
originalism:  the failure to understand and describe our history.56  The feature is 
remarkable because the interpretive methodology of originalism, in whatever (of 
the now myriad) of its iterations, purports to rely upon a forensic understanding of 
our historical past in order to achieve interpretive outcomes it claims are the most 
just.57     
Wurman goes further.  He puts the American citizen of today in a position of 
subjugation to the founding generation by claiming that Americans today are under 
a debt to the founding generation and that debt requires us “to obey and abide by” 
the Constitution it produced.58  Wurman’s defense of this definition of this 
 
53  Id. at 27. 
54  Id. at 41–43. 
55  Id. at 121–29. 
56  There is irony in this.  See McConnell, supra note 24, at 115 (“Theory and history have an 
uncomfortable relation.”).  This curious feature even extends to those who theorize about 
originalism and yet appear unaware that they have entered philosophical territory that long 
predates them.  See Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1330 (2017) (“Yet 
the authors [two originalism proponents] write as if those debates [about positivist and 
antipostivist notions about the law] never happened—as if the questions were never raised, let 
alone answers to them offered and challenged.”). 
57  See Solum & Bennett, supra note 51, at 2–3 (“The second idea that forms part of the core of 
contemporary originalism is that sound interpretation of the Constitution requires the recovery 
of original public meaning.  Although the first generation of originalists focused on the original 
intentions of the framers, contemporary originalists believe that the original public meaning of 
the Constitution is the meaning that the words and phrases had (or would have had) to ordinary 
members of the public.  So when we read the Constitution of 1789, our question should be, How 
would an ordinary American citizen fluent in English as spoken in the eighteenth century have 
understood words and phrases that make up its clauses?”). 
58  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 3.  Perhaps Wurman has identified the wrong segment of the 
population to which we are indebted in light of the extent to which the United States built wealth 
based upon slave labor.  In any case, Wurman does not seem to be aware of claims by historians 
that “written constitutions often function as ‘weapons of control’ rather than ‘documents of 
liberation and rights’” nor that such claims have been made in regard to the “original 
Constitution.”  Foner, supra note 33, at 2 (quoting historian Linda Colley). 
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methodology takes form as  a survey of the many arguments deployed in favor of 
originalism as well as a response to some arguments leveled against originalism.59  
But this survey is manifestly incomplete.  For instance, Wurman relies upon a 
limited presentation of the views of James Madison on originalism, without 
acknowledging that leading constitutionalists, such as Dean John Manning of 
Harvard Law School, have questioned this approach from one perspective.60  He also 
does so without  having discovered what Professor Gienapp has uncovered in regard 
to Madison’s views on constitutional interpretation, views that undermine the 
originalist argument.61 
More remarkably, Wurman ignores Justice Marshall’s obvious historical point 
about the Constitution:62 that Marshall and Wurman are not even talking about the 
same legal document.63  Setting aside Justice Marshall’s attack on the wisdom and 
virtue of the framers and their perspective on sound and moral governance, a theme 
 
59  See, e.g., Wurman, supra note 29, at 21 (“Originalism was initially justified . . . on the ground 
that it is the only theory consistent with the legitimate democratic Constitution”) (emphasis in 
original); id. at 29 (describing originalism as consistent with the underlying values of reducing a 
constitution to writing); id. at 39 (describing originalism as adaptable to the times); id. at 55–57 
(responding to critics of originalism like Jack Balkin and John Hart Ely). 
60  See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1998) (“Because the historical record offers no evidence that The 
Federalist was written or received with the understanding that Publius was declaring the intent of 
the framers or ratifiers, it could not have been the product of an implicit delegation to Publius to 
specify meaning outside of the process prescribed by Article VII.”). 
61  Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation 58 (2018). 
62  The very notion of what constituted a “constitution” was subject to uncertainty during the 
founding period.  See Larry Kramer, The People Themselves 9 (2004) (“The word ‘constitution’ 
had several meanings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”). 
63  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 83 (“The Founders helped create the only nation on the face of 
the earth that was, in Lincoln’s words, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that 
all men are created equal.  They overcame—for the most part—the passions and prejudices of a 
turbulent time.  I can think of no constitution that has been more successful or more enduring.”).  
But see Jill Lepore, These Truths: A History of the United States 99 (2018) (“The Declaration 
that Congress did adopt was a stunning rhetorical feat, an act of extraordinary political courage.  
It also marked a colossal failure of political will, in holding back the tide of opposition to slavery 
by ignoring it, for the sake of a union that, in the end, could not and would not last.”); Joseph J. 
Ellis, American Dialogue: The Founders and Us 14 (2018) (“This is the place to begin, not end, 
our investigation of the Jefferson legacy, namely with the realization that our most eloquent 
‘apostle of freedom’ is also our most dedicated racist, and that in his mind those two convictions 
were inseparable.”); Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism ix (1976) (“We can no 
longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the 
bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion.”). 
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that is central to this essay, Justice Marshall noted that if one were to lay out the 
operative provisions of the Constitution of 2019 next to the Constitution as 
originally enacted, one would find that it is not the same Constitution that the 
United States ratified between 1787 and 1789—not even remotely so.64   
The alterations to the text that Wurman ignores are staggering.65  They include 
substantial changes to the text of the governing framework of the United States that 
took place after 1789.66  These textual alterations include the addition of many 
substantial individual rights (e.g. the Bill of Rights), each with its own complex and 
diverse historical foundation.67  They also include the Reconstruction Amendments 
 
64  See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Root of the Problem: How the Proslavery Constitution Shaped American 
Race Relations, 4 BARRY L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2003) (identifying five provisions of the original constitution 
that “directly sanctioned slavery” and describing additional provisions that “indirectly guarded 
slavery”). 
65   See, e.g., Foner, supra note 33, at xiv–xviii (setting out in full the complete text of the 
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments).  If one were to compound these errors with 
Wurman’s failure to consider the interplay between state and federal constitutional law, 
Wurman’s account of the history of American constitutional law becomes even more implausible.  
See Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions 3 (2018) (describing the “complex interaction 
between the state and federal constitutions in construing similar state and federal constitutional 
guarantees.”); Goodwin Liu, State Courts and Constitutional Structure, 128 Yale L. J. 1304, 1311 (2018) 
(“What [Judge Sutton’s] narrations of those issues show is not a proliferation of state-specific 
discourses, but rather a single discourse in which state and federal courts are jointly engaged in 
interpreting shared texts or shared principles within a common historical tradition or common 
framework of constitutional reasoning.”).  The interplay between state and federal constitutions, 
and between the many other sources of government power, render the question of what is our 
constitution a far more complicated question than Wurman acknowledges.  See Gardner, supra 
note 7, at 89 (discussing the “possibility of a written constitution” for the UK, which constitutes 
“three distinct municipal systems” governed by a series of written laws given various priority by 
the actors who interpret and enforce them.). 
66  See, e.g., Foner, supra note 33, at xiv–xviii (setting out in full the complete text of the 
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments). 
67 See id. at xix–xxi (2019) (summarizing the massive effects of the reconstruction amendments 
on American law, none of which Wurman acknowledges); see also Rakove, supra note 32, at 9 (“But 
this latitudinarian attitude becomes less defensible if originalism seeks to provide something 
more than an informed point of departure.  For the argument that original meaning, once 
recovered, should be binding presents not only a strategy of interpretation but a rule of law.  It 
insists that original meaning should prevail—regardless of intervening revisions, deviations, and 
the judicial doctrine of stare decisis—because the authority of the Constitution as supreme law 
rests on its ratification by the special, popularly elected conventions of 1787–88); John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust 98–99 (1980) (“What has happened to the Constitution in the second 
century of our nationhood, though ground less frequently plowed, is most instructive on the 
subject of what jobs we have learned our basic document is suited to.  There were no amendments 
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and the delayed enfranchisement of half of the adult population, women.68   
These revolutionary changes share at least one common quality:  none were 
presented to the discreet voting-block constituting “the Framers who wrote the 
Constitution in 1787 and by the public that ratified it between 1787 and 1789” at the 
conventions preceding the adoption of the Constitution in 1787.69  Wurman’s 
approach, an approach that endorses the interpretive methodology of Attorney 
General Edward Meese in 1985,70 thus relies on siloed history from one of many 
important historical periods and so fails to acknowledge the basic historical facts 
about the Constitution.71   
One historian has even postulated that the perspective Wurman and Meese 
would have us obey died more than a century before either sought to resurrect it 
through originalism.72  The consequence of this approach to selling originalism73 is 
that Wurman is unable to persuasively present to his readers arguments about how 
the original public meaning of the Constitution in 1789 should interface with a very 
different Constitution, as it exists today, in 2020.74  In effect, Wurman would have 
 
between 1870 and 1913, but there have been eleven since.  Five of them extended the franchise” 
including the extension of the right to vote to women in the Nineteenth Amendment). 
68  Id.  
69  Wurman, supra note 29, at 11. 
70  Id. (quoting Meese as stating, “Those who framed the Constitution chose their words 
carefully; they debated at great length the minutest point.  The language they chose meant 
something.”).   At least one scholar has pointed out that the framers were purposely “unclear” in 
regard to constitutional text, even deceptively so.  See Michael Klarman, The Framers’ Coup 
264–65 (2016) (In the place of discussing slavery, the framers “insisted that the document use 
euphemisms, such as ‘other persons’” causing John Dickinson of Delaware to accuse the 
document of concealing a shameful principle the framers sought to entrench.).  
71  See Emil Kleinhaus, History as Precedent: The Post-Originalist Problem in Constitutional Law, 110 
Yale L.J. 121, 122 (2000) (“The originalist project, by all accounts, relies heavily on historical 
analysis.”). 
72  See Richard White, The Republic for Which it Stands 1 (2017) (“In 1865 an older 
American nation had died, a casualty of the Civil War . . . . How the United States at the end of the 
nineteenth century turned out to be so different from the country that Lincoln conjured and 
Republicans confidently set out to create is the subject of this book.”).    
73  See Greene, supra note 5, at 659 (coining the term and describing originalism as an “item[] of 
political commerce”). 
74  See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 14, at 949 (proposing a synthetic relationship between the 14th 
Amendment and the later enacted 19th Amendment); see also Lessig, supra note 5, at 16 (“A 
constitution is text.  Any text gets written against a background.  Call that background its context.  
That includes a host of assumptions that inform any reading of the text.  Those assumptions are 
stuff against which the text has meaning.  Those assumptions change.  And the one truly difficult 
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us ignore the voices and perspectives of millions and millions of Americans who 
lived after 1789, including hundreds and hundreds of thousands of men and women 
who fought wars to establish, defend, and protect this nation.75  It is not difficult to 
see the dishonor in this approach, to say nothing about the manner in which it is 
deeply undemocratic.76 
Wurman avoids this history even as he devotes a chapter to discussing whether 
it is even possible to use history in disputes over the application of constitutional 
principles.77  In discussing the subject, Wurman divides the world into originalists 
on the one hand and historicists and relativists on the other.78  Wurman frames his 
approach as standing up for a defense of historical truth, aligning himself with the 
 
problem of constitutional interpretation is to figure out when the change.  Do you read the text as 
it would have been read originally, imagining yourself back in the original context of 
interpretation?  Or do you read the text as it would be read the text as it would be read today, 
ignoring the changes in these background assumptions?  Or do you ignore some changes but 
recognize others?  And you’re selective, what rule determines the criterial for selectivity?”). 
75  See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, Our Democracy’s Founding Ideals Were False When They Were 
Written.  Black Americans Have Fought to Make Them True, NY Times Mag. (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-history-american-
democracy.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/
E4EV-97QW] (“Without the idealistic, strenuous and patriotic efforts of black Americans, our 
democracy today would most likely look very different—it might not be a democracy at all.  The 
very first person to die for this country in the American Revolution was a black man who himself 
was not free.”); see also Vann R. Newkirk, II, This Land Was Our Land: How Nearly 1 Million Black 
Farmers were Robbed of Their Livelihood, The Atlantic 72, 80–81 (Sept. 2019) (“World War II 
transformed America in many ways.  It certainly transformed a generation of Southern black 
men.  That generation included Medger Evers, a future civil-rights martyr; assassinated while 
leading the Mississippi NAACP; he served in a segregated transportation company in Europe 
during the war. . . . These men were less patient, more defiant, and in many ways more reckless 
than their fathers and grandfathers had been.”). 
76  See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“It was enough for [the founders] for them 
to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their 
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.  The case before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred 
years ago.”). 
77  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 102 (“Finally, perhaps a more interesting attack on the use of 
history is the claim that there’s no such thing as objective historical knowledge at all.  This notion 
is rooted in two philosophical innovations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries:  historicism 
and relativism.”). 
78  See id. at 102–03.  See also Fred Baumann, Historicism and the Constitution, in Confronting 
the Constitution 286 (Allan Bloom, ed. 1990) (“Historicism, which denies the possibility of 
universal human principles, has incited a number of characteristic American responses.”). 
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political philosopher, Leo Strauss, a powerful critic of historicism and relativism.79  
But he creates a strawman by avoiding the most obvious challenge to his own 
argument.  He fails to consider the perspective of Justice Marshall,80 an advocate for 
historical truth81 and universal principles of liberalism, who delivered a history-
based argument against originalism.82   
In this regard, Wurman’s scholarship steps backward from acknowledgements 
made by prior defenses of originalism, including from scholars such as John O. 
McGinnis of Northwestern Law School and Michael B. Rappaport of University of 
San Diego, leaders in this field.  Wurman fails to address Justice Marshall’s critique 
even as these scholars raise these issues with deep concern.83  Having ignored 
 
79  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 104–05. 
80  This perspective included living through, and assessing, the nightmare of judicial passivity 
and its implications for our laws and the standing of traditional due process in the face of a 
coerced confession elicited after shocking, racist police brutality, a perspective entirely absent 
from Wurman’s account of constitutional history.  See Thurgood Marshall, Lyons v. Oklahoma 
(1944), Thurgood Marshall, His Speeches, Writings, Arguments, Opinions and 
Reminiscences 3–9 (Mark V. Tushnet ed. 2001) (the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction of an African-American man whom Oklahoma officials beat a confession out of under 
conditions that would constitute torture). 
81  See also Loewen, supra note 16, at xvii (“When people say to me that there’s no such thing as 
truth, I sometimes reply with a little schtick: ‘Right And the Civil War begin in 1876, in Nevada.  It 
grew from a pay dispute between the Union Pacific Rail Road and its Chinese workers.’”). 
82  See, e.g., Lucius J. Barker, Thurgood Marshall, the Law, and the System: Tenets of an Enduring 
Legacy, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1237, 1238 (1992) (“To Marshall, the law was animated by aspirations 
enshrined in the Declaration of Independence; values that transcended the law’s temporal 
function of regulating behavior vis-à-vis one another.”).  See also Richard Fallon, Jr., Law, 
Legitimacy and the Supreme Court 30–31 (2018) (“When we judge the moral legitimacy of 
political regimes . . . we must consider whether the severe disadvantaging of some group relative 
to others might make a legal order morally illegitimate—even in what I have called the minimal 
sense—with respect to members of those disadvantaged groups but not to other members of the 
community.  An example may come from the pre-Civil War legal regime in the United States . . . I 
would confidently deny that it imposed any of the obligations on enslaved African Americans that 
we ordinarily regard the notion of moral legitimacy importing. . . . If this conclusion is correct, it 
has potentially uncomfortable implications for well-off Americans, and especially well-off whites 
such as me:  we need to take seriously the question whether the American legal system is 
minimally morally legitimate today in its relationship to minorities groups in our society.”). 
83  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 9–10 (discussing Justice Marshall’s critique as 
pointing and noting that, “[s]trikingly . . . originalists have not substantially addressed the more 
pervasive critique—that the original meaning of a document built on exclusion cannot be a guide 
to constitutional interpretation in a society where that exclusion is almost universally condemned 
as unjust and is indeed rightly seen as the original sin of the United States.”); see also id. at 100–115 
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philosophical allies, it is not surprising that Wurman fails to face the charge from 
scholars such as Jamal Greene of Columbia Law School that originalism has a race 
problem that originalists like Wurman so often ignore.84 
Perhaps this perspective explains why Wurman also fails to satisfactorily 
address some of the more profound methodological problems with his thesis.  For 
instance, in the succeeding chapter in which Wurman addresses arguments that 
originalism is inconsistent with Brown v. Board of Education,85 he leaves Marshall’s 
challenge out of his discussion all together.86  Of course, Marshall was the architect 
of that great decision as its lead litigator.87  The omission is remarkable because 
 
(discussing responses to this critique, which rest on the desire to uphold supermajoritarian 
principles the scholars deem consistent with a good constitution).  But see Wurman, supra note 
29, at 147 n. 58 (acknowledging and citing to McGinnis and  
Rappaport but ignoring their observations).  McGinnis and Rappaport offer an unsatisfying 
defense, themselves.  While beginning the process of incorporating evil history into their 
assessment of originalism, they argue that supermajoritarianism is a value within the 
constitution that saves it and renders it a “good constitution.”   They do not address has super 
majoritarianism delayed civil rights legislation for almost one hundred years as a result of the 
operations of the United States Senate.  See Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chermerinsky, The Filibuster, 
49 Stan. L. Rev. 181, 199–200 (1997) (“Beginning during Reconstruction and continuing for nearly 
a century, anti-civil rights filibusters [in the United States Senate] played a major role in blocking 
measures to prohibit lynching, poll taxes and race discrimination in employment, housing, public 
accommodations and voting.”).  They do not appear to address concerns about the 
supermajoritarian “entrenchment” of evil more generally within the U.S. Constitution more 
generally.  See Paul Starr, Entrenchment 66 (2019) (“Even after slavery had taken root in the 
colonies, Americans might have abolished it when they achieved independence and framed a new 
political system ostensibly on the principles of liberty and equality.  The Revolution did lead, over 
several decades, to the emancipation of slaves in the states north of Delaware, but the 
Constitution entrenched the power of southern slaveholders in the national government and, by 
doing so, entrenched slaves societies in the southern states.”). 
84  Cf. Greene, supra note 40, at 521 (“So understood, the divide between originalists and living 
constitutionalists is between those who believe we are at our best when we are who we have been 
and those who believe we are at our best when we are who we might become.”). 
85  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
86  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 108–16.  One wonders if this omission illustrates an overall 
contempt for one of the greatest, most accomplished and courageous attorneys in the history of 
the United States.    
87  See Gilbert King, Devil in the Grove 2 (2012) (“By the mid-1940s, Marshall, the grandson 
of a mixed-race slave named Thorney Good Marshall, was engineering the greatest social 
transformation in America since the Reconstruction era.  He had already devoted more than a 
decade of his career to overcoming the ‘inherent defects’ of a Constitution that allowed, by law, 
social injustices against blacks who had been denied not only the right to vote, but also equal rights 
and opportunities in education, housing and employment.  With his far-reaching triumphs in 
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Marshall’s most famous accomplishment, de jure desegregation through court 
decisions, stands as the singular counter-monument to the claims of originalism.88  
Perhaps even more remarkable, nowhere in Wurman’s book does he discuss the 
topic of gender discrimination.  And so, just as he sidelines the accomplishments of 
Justice Marshall, he sidelines the remarkable work of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
whose victories in the area of equal protection and gender discrimination pose 
similar, unanswerable challenges to the originalist methodology as Wurman 
defines it.89  Instead, Wurman’s writing appears to approach the framers’ influence 
over constitutional methodology as a form of worship, disconnected from the 
reality of the substantial influence Marshall, Ginsburg, and so many other legal 
titans of the past century continue to have on our constitutional law.90   
 
landmark cases he argued before the U.S. Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall would indeed 
redefine justice in a multiracial nation and become, as one civil rights pioneer described him, the 
Founding Father of the New America.”); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 563 (2004) (describing 
Marshall’s preparations for oral arguments in the case); see also Rawn James, Jr., Root and 
Branch  230 (2010) (“For a week he had been camped in a Washington hotel room, and for months 
he had been orchestrating a research campaign that eclipsed the Promethean effort preceding 
Brown’s first oral argument one year ago.”). 
88  See Strang, supra note 6, at 21; Hon. David H. Souter, Harvard Commencement Remarks, The 
Harvard Gazette (May 27, 2010), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-
justice-david-souters-speech/ [https://perma.cc/4D2M-UN44] (“For those whose exclusive norm 
for constitutional judging is merely fair reading of language applied to facts objectively viewed, 
Brown must either be flat-out wrong or a very mystifying decision.  Those who look to that model 
are not likely to think that a federal court back in 1896 should have declared legally mandated racial 
segregation unconstitutional . . . . As I’ve said elsewhere, the members of the Court in Plessy 
remembered the day when human slavery was the law in much of the land.  To that generation, 
the formal equality of an identical railroad car meant progress.”).  Originalist proponents have a 
hard time respecting even this accomplishment, suggesting that Brown is a decision that is part 
of decisions that litter our jurisprudence as if it is a decision that could be discarded as some sort 
of trash.    
89  See Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 162–63 (“When the post-Civil War amendments were added to 
the Constitution, women were not accorded the vote, the right now regarded by the Supreme 
Court as most basic to adult citizenship.  Married women in many states could not contract, hold 
property, litigate on their own behalf, or even control their own earnings.  The fourteenth 
amendment left all that untouched.  To the nineteenth century jurist, change in women’s status, 
alteration of laws restricting a woman’s options, was state business, not fit subject matter for 
federal statutory or constitutional resolution.”); see also Siegel, supra note 14 (describing the 
history of the suffrage movement as a “lost chapter of our constitutional history”—a charitable 
description). 
90  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 3 (claiming that his book argues that “the Constitution does 
form a debt against us—against the living generation—that compels us to continue to obey and 
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The title of the second book this review assesses, Professor Eric Segall’s 
Originalism as Faith, would suggest to the reader a critique of originalism that draws 
similar parallels between religious devotion and historical and scientific denial.91  
Only the smallest portion of the book is devoted to that sort of analysis.92  The 
remainder is largely consumed with describing the academic history of originalism, 
the various ways in which originalism fails to meet its aims, and the ways in which 
the various iterations of originalism have rendered the methodology 
indistinguishable from competing interpretive methodologies.93  Admittedly, 
Segall, a constitutional law professor at Georgia State University, alludes to the 
problem presented by Justice Marshall on the first page of his book.94  Beyond 
tracking the development of methodologies, however, his is not a book long on an 
assessment of American history, and it does not devote substantial time to attacking 
originalism as a morally and historically compromised method of interpretation, 
compromised, principally, in the ways Justice Marshall described it.95  Instead, 
Segall describes the central flaws in the originalist project in terms that assume the 
 
abide by it today.”); Kleinhaus, supra note 71, at 130–31 (exploring parallels between originalism 
and “Catholic” and “Protestant” strains of interpretation).    
91  See Segall, supra note 30; cf. Balkin, supra note 12, at 7 (“Why use such religious imagery 
when the project is clearly secular?  The reason is that constitutional traditions have much in 
common with religious traditions, and especially religious traditions that feature a central 
organizing text that states the tradition’s core beliefs.”). 
92  See Segall, supra note 30, at 171 (“The first part of this chapter critically reviews Solum’s 
testimony [in support of the nomination of Justice Gorsuch’s appointment to the United Supreme 
Court] while the rest suggests that its dogmatism is consistent with how other originalists try to 
spread the word and keep the faith.”). 
93  See Ilan Wurman, Originalism’s New Critics, Part 2:  Faith, Claremont Review of Books (Jan. 16, 
2019) https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/digital/originalisms-new-critics-part-2-faith/ [https:/
/perma.cc/DX7E-CYKB] (“Segall’s account of originalism in practice, and also of some modern 
originalists, is undeniably fair, thoughtful and in many ways accurate.  Some schools of 
originalism may very well be hard to distinguish from living constitutionalism.”). 
94  Segall, supra note 30, at 1 (“America’s founding fathers owned slaves, denied women most 
basic rights, and inhabited a world devoid of the modern technologies that shape our everyday 
life.”). 
95  But see id. at 28–29 (discussing arguments over the use of original public meaning evidence 
in Dred Scott and noting that “[t]oday, all we can agree on is that the result in Dred Scott is horrific 
by our modern standards.”); see also id. at 66 (describing Paul Brest’s attack on originalism, which 
included the observation that “women and racial minorities were not allowed to take part in the 
drafting and ratification of the original Constitution and the Reconstruction Amendments” and 
commenting that this “creates serious problems of democratic legitimacy.”). 
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opposite.96  His critique notes that originalism has never been the exclusive or 
principal mode of interpretation adopted by the United States Supreme Court.97  He 
notes that adopting it, now, to the exclusion of all other approaches, would result in 
unacceptable outcomes, and that recent iterations of originalism (e.g. “inclusive 
originalism) appear to undermine original justifications for it as a doctrine.98  With 
regard to this last point, he highlights that newer descriptions of originalism, such 
as “inclusive originalism,” acknowledge that the constitution yields evidence that 
the original public meaning of its phrases are susceptible to evolving 
interpretations, rendering originalism indistinguishable from its rival, living 
constitutionalism.99 
Recognizing the need for some alternative approach to addressing the question 
of how to decide cases in a principled way under some better methodology, 
Professor Segall proposes a “clear error rule.”  This rule would strengthen the power 
of elected officials by permitting judicial review to invalidate legislation only where 
a “challenged law or practice clearly violates constitutional text.”100  This solution, 
ironically, is one Segall argues is consistent with originalist notions of judicial 
review.101   
 Segall does not appear to acknowledge that his approach would raise questions 
about whether landmark decisions would survive efforts by elected officials to 
undermine established constitutional law through legislation to which Segall would 
grant a presumption of legitimacy.  He would have to answer the question, for 
instance, “What is clear about the application of Roe v. Wade or Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey?”102 in an environment where state legislatures across the country are 
proposing legislation designed to challenge the decision at various levels of 
abstraction.103    
 
96  Id. at 3. 
97  Id. at 89. 
98  See, e.g., id. at 3–5 (summarizing the book’s aims); id. at 52 (describing landmark decisions 
that could not be squared with originalism); id. at 82–121 (comprehensive discussion of numerous 
iterations of originalism). 
99  Id. at 104 (“Baude’s definition of originalism, however, is virtually indistinguishable from the 
non-originalist, ‘living constitution’ approach that supported the liberal Warren Court decisions 
that the Original Originalists criticized.”). 
100  Id. at 13. 
101  Id. at 2 (“the founding fathers thought judges should overturn state and federal laws only 
when such enactments clearly violated the Constitution.”). 
102  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
103  See Jenny Jarvie, Conservative states enact abortion bands in hope of overturning Roe v. Wade, L.A. 
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Even more problematic to Segall’s solution (and to Wurman’s thesis), are the 
findings presented by Professor Jonathan Gienapp, a History professor at Stanford 
University.  These findings attack the core assumption Segall presents to justify his 
alternative methodology.  Where Segall proposes that the founders viewed judicial 
invalidation of legislative enactments as justified only where a clear conflict 
between popular enactment and constitutional text arose, Gienapp reveals that the 
founders doubted that constitutional text would, or could, ever be clear enough to 
justify a text-centric approach to constitutional interpretation.104  According to 
Gienapp’s research, James Madison, himself, criticized popular state lawmaking as 
having led to “reckless and vicious legislation” which he deplored.  He sought to 
remedy what he observed through the creation of a stronger central government 
and a constitution whose broader principles would stand in contrast to the text-
focused practices of ordinary lawmaking.105  Gienapp links these views to a liberal 
tradition that doubted the determinacy of words and text and raised concerns about 
a legal methodology that placed too great a reliance on written text as a means, 
alone, for drawing manageable boundaries by which to chart a constitutional 
order.106 
Gienapp’s history goes further, revealing that despite what originalists believe, 
the founding generation had little shared, ascertainable sense of what the 
Constitution and its provisions meant before ratifying those provisions, and that 
post-ratification debates and conduct were necessary to give our constitutional 
order understandable structure.107  The use of post-ratification conduct as an 
 
Times (May 11, 2019 6:37 PM) https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-abortion-bans-states-roe-
wade-supreme-court-20190511-story.html [https://perma.cc/R35S-WYDR] (“For years, 
conservatives in Southern and Midwestern states have been passing laws that restrict women’s 
access to abortion” and describing different approaches taken in this regard.). 
104  See Gienapp, supra note 61, at 58 (“But even though the Convention’s energies were focused 
on writing a new constitution, and even though the particular controversies implicated by 
expanding federal authority heightened awareness of the text’s reach, following Madison’s 
sentiments in the ‘Vices,’ delegates largely refused to imagine the project of writing a constitution 
through a textual prism.”). 
105  See id. at 54.  See also Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty 405 (2009) (recounting the 
negative experiences of early Americans with “[u]nstable, annually elected, and logrolling 
democratic legislatures” who drafted “laws proliferate in ever-increasing numbers”). 
106  See Gienapp, supra note 61, at 45 (“While more immediately focused on semantics and 
philosophy, Locke, like the reformers who followed him, acutely appreciated how linguistic 
instability affected social authority, especially the domains of religion and law.”). 
107  See id. at 9 (“Even though users of the Constitution after 1788 were not engaged in rewriting 
the document, by breathing life into certain norms and practices of constitutional justification 
they nonetheless gave an uncertain governing instrument shape and invested it with distinct 
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accepted part of constitutional interpretation, of course, threatens a principal 
justification for originalism, the notion that a Constitution becomes “fixed” at a 
moment in a manner that causes it to have legitimacy as law.108    
That notion, Gienapp reveals, is not consistent with the more fluid conception 
of what a constitution was to a government in the eighteenth century, and to the 
framers who brought the Constitution into existence.  According to Gienapp, 
Americans had lived under the unwritten constitution of Great Britain and “still 
imagined constitutionalism as they long had, without many of the distinctions we 
tend to assume they must have drawn.”109  Americans assumed that “[w]ithout clear 
rules, linguistic meaning would be governed by everyday practice, so over time, as 
that usage changed, so too would the meaning of words.”110  They were wary of the 
“rule of words” now so fundamental to the originalism methodology.111  Gienapp 
thus proposes that the project originalists engage in, the search for fixed meaning, 
is not a project that can, or could ever, be accomplished on the terms originalists 
like Wurman have described.112  Gienapp’s history is not overtly normative and so it 
is beyond the scope of Gienapp’s project to determine just how far into the future 
Americans could travel, post-ratification, while fixing the Constitution through 
post-ratification thought and conduct.  The challenge Gienapp poses to originalism 
is demonstrated by efforts to bury his work rather than confront it.113 
 
kinds of authority.”). 
108  See Wurman, supra note 29, at 96 (“This ultimate interpretive convention—that of liquidating 
and fixing indeterminate meaning—was thus the most important convention of them all.”).  
109  See Gienapp, supra note 61, at 35. 
110  Id. at 43. 
111  Id. at 50.  Wurman attempts to address these issues but fails to account for the deep and 
broad anti-textual history Gienapp presents.  See Wurman, supra note 93. 
112  See Gienapp, supra note 61, at 334 (“The irony of the endless search for the original 
Constitution is that such an inquiry will never reveal a fixed document.  These efforts can only 
expose—should its inquirers be willing to see it—the story of how a contingent set of practices 
made it possible thereafter to imagine the Constitution in that way, a narrative about how the 
activities of fixing ended up producing a fascination with fixity.”); see also John Burt, Lincoln’s 
Tragic Pragmatism (2013) (“The ruling values of the constitutional order . . . restlessly and 
endlessly become, because they are saturated with an implicitness that no particular development 
of them, no conception, suffices to exhaust.”); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1, 3 (2019) (“But precedent and originalism do not exhausted the role of historical argument 
in constitutional law.  Constitutional law is also rife with claims of authority by historical 
practice.”). 
113  See, e.g., Strang, supra note 6, at 11 n.7 (2019) (consigning Gienapp’s work to the bottom of a 
lengthy footnote as a “counterargument” though it poses a substantial challenge to most of the 
scholar’s case for originalism). 
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I I .  B L UNT I NG T HE  S P R E AD OF  E V I L  HI S T OR Y  
Justice Marshall, of course, approached the subjects addressed in each book 
from a different angle.  His critique is both obvious and, somehow, not given 
primacy in the sorts of contemporary discussions about originalism set forth in the 
books under review.  Marshall argued, at least implicitly, that the sort of analysis 
that takes place in all three books ignores (or in Segall’s case, mentions, but does not 
pursue at length) the implications of the deep failures of the founding generation.  
These books therefore cannot answer Marshall’s claim that American history should 
cause us to reject originalism as a methodology because it would rely on 
perspectives that could not, and would not, be acceptable to Americans in the 
modern world, for good reason.    
 The risks of ignoring Marshall’s critique of originalism can be re-described in a 
hypothetical.  Imagine you are constructing a theory of interpretation to assist you 
in construing a law that would prohibit governmental conduct amounting to 
“cruelty.”114  You have a general sense that the word has to do with mistreatment of 
some kind, but you also know that people differ as to whether mistreatment is 
“cruel” or just mistreatment that is not quite “cruel” and may even be justified.  
Under those circumstances, you concede that the word depends on peoples’ notions 
of just how bad the mistreatment must get before it is considered “cruel.” 
In interpreting the word, you get to take a poll.  The poll asks for definitions.  It 
also asks for a series of narrative examples of what is “cruel.”  That process will create 
the boundary lines for the definition of what is “cruel” as it is defined for the purpose 
of assessing levels of permissible mistreatment under the law.  Here is the catch.  
You do not get to ask your contemporaries about how they would define the term.  
You do not even get to ask your grandparents, or great-grandparents, or great-
great-grandparents.   
Instead, you must ask a limited slice of an ancient generation of adult men.115 
These were men who enslaved other men, women and children.116  They participated 
 
114  This is a word to which Frederick Douglass gave definition as a human who experienced 
cruelty in his own time.  See Frederick Douglass, supra note 44 (“What, to the American slave, is 
your 4th of July?  I answer:  a day that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross 
injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim.”). 
115  See Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? 2 (2d ed. 2003) 
(“My question, then, is this: Why should we feel bound today by a document produced more than 
two centuries ago by a group of fifty-five mortal men, actually signed by only thirty-nine, a fair 
number of whom were slaveholders, and adopted in only thirteen states by the votes of fewer than 
two thousand men, all of whom are long since dead and mainly forgotten?”). 
116  See infra notes 144–46; see also Sheryll Cashin, Loving: Interracial Intimacy in American 
and the Threat to White Supremacy 5 (2017) (“Over three centuries, our nation was caught in 
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in the mass removal of a native people through calculated deception.117  They viewed 
women and children as property.118  They viewed homosexuality as criminal and 
immoral.119  They had not solved polio or small pox, and had a very short life-
expectancy.120  They were not even aware of how bacteria spread within hospitals 
because of lack of basic sanitary practices.121  They did not know about the theory of 
evolution or the theory of relativity.  They could not have envisioned modern genetic 
medicine, game-theory,122 public choice theory,123 advances in cognitive 
 
a seemingly endless cycle of political and economic elites using law to separate light and dark 
people who might love one another or revolt together against supremacist regimes the economic 
elites created.”). 
117  See Colin G. Calloway, The Indian World of George Washington 13 (2018) (“From 
cradle to grave Washington inhabited a world built on the labor of African people and on the land 
of dispossessed Indian people.”); id. at 12 (“Washington, more than most, had a hand on the scales 
and was instrumental in the dispossession, defeat, exploitation and marginalization of Indian 
peoples.”). 
118  See supra notes 25–26; see also Catherine MacKinnon, Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws 116 
(2005) (“No woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the social order 
under which women, as well as men, live.”). 
119  See Grant Darwin, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 16 U. Pa. J. L. & Soc. Change 237, 263–
65 (2013) (describing anti-homosexuality laws in early America); but see William N. Eskridge Jr., 
The Nineteenth Annual Frankel Lecture: Address: Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 Hous. L. 
Rev. 1067, 1094 (2015) (“In 1868, there was no anti-gay or anti-homosexual caste regime, because 
there was no social class of gay or homosexual persons.”) 
120  Michael Lewis, Old Age and Judging, 47 N.H. B.J. 42, 43 (2006) (describing substantial 
alterations to life expectancy after 1860 and that almost half of the population born in that year 
died before reaching the age of 65) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
121  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Contagiousness of Puerperal Fever, 1 New Eng. Q.J. of Med. & 
Surgery 503, 503–30 (1843). 
122  Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law, (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law 
& Econ., Working Paper No. 22, 1994) (“Game theory has emerged to augment the standard, polar 
approaches of pure competition and monopoly . . . . A definition might be useful; as a rough cut, 
try: game theory is a set of tools and a language for describing and predicting strategic behavior.”). 
123  See Daniel Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 873–
75, 878–79 (1987) (providing general discussion of the subject). 
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 8 : 2  ( 2 0 2 0 )  
292 
psychology,124 or information technology.125  They lived by candlelight126 and 
traveled by horse.  They adopted views of international law and the behavior of 
public actors that would justify conduct we would now consider war crimes.127  They 
did not have the benefit of any lessons about human behavior arising from the Civil 
War, the Industrial Revolution, the Gilded Age,128 Jim Crow, World War I, the 
American eugenics movement,129 the Holocaust, World War II, Japanese American 
 
124  Charles W. Murdock & Barry Sullivan, What Kahneman Means for Lawyers:  Some Reflections on 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1377, 1377–78 (2013) (implications of research to classic 
rationalist modes of thinking); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of our Categories, 47 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1161, 1164–65 (1995) (arguing that failures in anti-discrimination law “stems from the 
assumption that disparate treatment discrimination, whether conscious or unconscious, is 
primarily motivational rather than cognitive, in origin.”). 
125  See Urs Gasser, Recoding Privacy Law:  Reflections on the Future Relationship Among Law, 
Technology, and Privacy, 130 Harv. L. Rev. F. 61, 61 (2016) (“The history of privacy is deeply 
intertwined with the history of technology.”). 
126  Cf. Elizabeth Palermo, Who Invented the Light Bulb?, Live Science (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://www.livescience.com/43424-who-invented-the-light-bulb.html [https://perma.cc/Y8JJ-
VNGA] (describing the history of the light bulb, which did not become commercially successful 
until the late 19th century). 
127  Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists xvi, 11–12, 24 (2017) 
(describing the “old world order” as advocating “might is right” in international relations). 
128  White, supra note 72, at 2–3 (“[T]he Gilded Age begins in 1865 with Reconstruction and ends 
with the election of William McKinley.  This period for a long time devolved into historical flyover 
country. . . . Such neglect has changed with recent scholarship that has revealed a country 
transformed by immigration, urbanization, environmental crisis, political stalemate, new 
technologies, the creation of powerful corporations, income inequality, failures of governance, 
mounting class conflict, and increasing social, cultural and religious diversity.”). 
129  See Daniel Okrent, The Guarded Gate 8 (2019) (“The scientific colossus that eventually 
blossomed in Cold Spring Harbor, and that, along the way would develop the intellectual 
arguments for limiting immigration to the United States by country of origin, began life in 1890 
as the biological laboratory of the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences . . . ”); Neil M. Gorsuch, 
The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 34 (2006) (“Perhaps the eugenics movement’s 
most successful initial inroads into American society involved the forced sterilization of the 
mentally ill.”); Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics (1995 ed.) (“The specter of eugenics 
hovers over virtually all contemporary developments in human genetics . . . During the heyday of 
eugenics—much of the first half of the twentieth century—social prejudice often overwhelmed 
scientific objectivity in the investigation of human genetics.  Social distinctions of race and class 
were commonly attributed to differences in biological merit.”); see also Andrew Solomon, The 
Dignity of Disabled Lives, NY Times (Sept. 2, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/
opinion/disabled-human-rights.html [https://perma.cc/8VT6-8QV4] (“The eugenic movement 
spearheaded by Francis Galton in England in the late Victorian period reached a culmination in 
the view that if you got rid of the misfits, you could breed a pure, advantaged race.”). 
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Internment, the Korean War, the Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War, the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russian incursions into our democracy that threaten 
our national security,130 and efforts by our executive branch to deploy foreign 
leaders in the Ukraine to prosecute political opponents.131    
A critique of originalism leveled from Marshall’s perspective might ask: Do you 
believe that such a poll that would ignore all of this information, evidence, and all of 
the perspectives from all of the people who contributed to advances in so many 
fields (including some hard won through great wars and movements) would yield 
opinions that you would want to live by?132  Would it yield interpretive consequences 
you could justify with respect to principles of justice?133  His answer would appear 
to be “no.”  Yet this is the very paradigm originalists demand of Americans as they 
interpret concepts like “cruelty” in the most fraught legal situations we see 
presented to our courts.134 
 Consider Justice Gorsuch’s observation in Bucklew v. Precythe last term, where 
he used as evidence of the constitutional status of capital punishment, that “death 
 
130  David E. Sanger & Catie Edmondson, Russia Targeted Election Systems in All 50 States, Report 
Finds, N.Y. Times (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/politics/russian-
hacking-elections.html [https://perma.cc/VH8J-32HC].  
131  At least one conservative justice has mocked this notion.   See David Gans, Justices Scalia, Alito 
Square Off on Originalism, Balkinization (Nov. 4, 2010) https://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/11/
justices-scalia-alito-square-off-on.html [https://perma.cc/Q3CK-JZXV] (“Mocking Justice Scalia’s 
approach, Justice Alito shot back, telling California’s Deputy Attorney General that ‘what Justice 
Scalia wants to know is what James Madison thought about video games’ and ‘if he enjoyed 
them.’”).  See Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine’s Zelensky Bowed to Trump’s Demands, Until Luck Spared Him, 
N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/world/europe/ukraine-trump-
zelensky.html [https://perma.cc/7KZ4-VM8J]. 
132  Cf. Rosa Brooks, Constitution in Crisis, Has America’s Founding Document Become the Nation’s 
Undoing, HARPER’S, Oct. 2019,  at 26 (“After everybody has a chance to talk about how great it is that 
the United States has this very, very old written constitution, I ask [my students] how they would 
feel if their neurosurgeon used the world’s oldest neurosurgery guide, or if NASA used the world’s 
oldest astronomical chart to plan space-shuttle flights, and they all get quiet.”). 
133  To say nothing of the choices you might make if you were, as you may be, consigned to some 
level of disadvantage in this world.  Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 17–22 (1971) (Discussing 
the “original position” and its “justification.”); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 183 
(2013 ed.) (“A Theory of Justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political 
and moral philosophy . . . Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls’ theory or 
explain why not.”).   
134  Cf. Jill Lepore, This America: The Case for the Nation 47 (2019) (“Also, looking to the 
question of African slavery, he wondered what other nation in the world was guilty of stealing the 
people of another nation ‘to till their grounds, and welter out the days under the lash with hunger 
and fatigue.’”) (quoting William Apess, An Indian’s Looking-Glass for the White-Man (1833)). 
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was ‘the standard penalty for all serious crimes’ at the time of the founding.”135  
Nothing in Justice Gorsuch’s methodology permits the further observation that a 
similar approach was deployed in Nazi Germany by Nazi legal theorists.136  So 
nothing in his opinion weighs whether such information would or should impact 
his reliance on practices at the time of the founding.137  The methodological choice 
he made in order to invoke originalism, which is also a moral choice given the 
methodological alternatives to Gorsuch’s originalism,138 is to ignore this 
information in rendering legal conclusions that impact the lives of his 
contemporaries.139   
Disturbingly, Justice Gorsuch, applying originalism, appears to revel in facts 
about the pain the founding generation inflicted on its fellow humans, which he 
describes in visceral detail.140  In the process, Justice Gorsuch makes no room for the 
special, racial symbolism of hanging in this country even though lynching141 has 
 
135  See Bucklew, slip op. at 3. 
136  Brief of Respondents at 42–43, Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (No. 17-8151). 
137  See Herlinde Pauer-Studer & J. David Vellemen, Konrad Morgan: The Conscience 
of a Nazi Judge 26–28 (2015) (describing the undifferentiated approaches to sentencing for 
crimes promoted by Nazi theorists).  It is also a moral choice that was rejected by state 
constitutionalists.  See N.H. Const. part I, art. 18 (“No wise legislature will affix the same 
punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery, and the like, which they do to those of murder and 
treason.  Where the same undistinguished severity is exerted against all offenses, the people are 
led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with 
as little compunction as they do the lightest offenses.”). 
138   As distinguished from other formulations.  Cf. Charles L. Black, Jr. & Philip Bobbitt, 
Impeachment: A Handbook 5–6 (2018 ed.) (“One further point:  it is the cardinal principle at least 
of American constitutional interpretation that the Constitution is to be interpreted so as to be 
workable and reasonable.  This principle does not collide with respect for the ‘intent of the 
Framers,’ because their transcendent intent was to build just such a Constitution.”). 
139  See Martin S. Flaherty, Historians and the New Originalism: Contextualism, Historicism, and 
Constitutional Meaning, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 905, 913 (2015) (“Perhaps most pernicious, though, 
ultimately more readily detected, is a further misuse of history that I more recently termed history 
‘bullshit.’. . . Applied to originalism, the idea means an assertion about the past that ultimately has 
no concern for whether the claim is correct or incorrect, but instead considers whether the claim 
offers the kinds of originality, boldness, and cleverness that lead either to academic or Article III 
life tenure.”).   
140  Bucklew, slip op. at 11 (“More often it seems the prisoner would die from loss of blood flow to 
the brain, which could produce unconsciousness usually within seconds, or suffocation, which 
could take several minutes.”). 
141  See Michele Norris, So you want to talk about lynching?  Understand this first., Wash. Post (Oct. 
23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/so-you-want-to-talk-about-lynching-
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provided our most barbaric and upsetting evidence (including through disturbing 
photographic images) of racial violence.142  For Justice Gorsuch, nothing that we 
have learned, since, about ways to execute people without suffocating them to death 
over a period of minutes, would cause him to discount this information in shaping 
our law.143 
The choice to rely upon the values and perspectives of the founding generation 
faces an even more pervasive moral challenge ignored by Wurman, Gorsuch, and 
(largely) by other originalists.  The problem of American slavery, and the fact that 
the founding generation was “inextricably bound up in it,” is a problem that looms 
so large, exerting so much pressure upon our celebration of that time, that it is not 
altogether surprising that so many choose to ignore it.144  Yet the constitutional 
bargains that the founders made145 and which the founding generation ratified, set 
 
understand-this-first/2019/10/23/c5a5fd2a-f5ae-11e9-ad8b-85e2aa00b5ce_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/XF9D-84TV] (“A lynching was often accompanied by long-term amnesia.  The 
people behind those acts would eventually forget this history, forget that this is what transpired 
in the town square or tobacco field, forget that they were engaged in what would now pass as evil 
because, jeez, who would want to claim that?”). 
142  See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Foreword to Thurgood Marshall, Thurgood Marshall: His 
Speeches, Writings, Arguments, Opinions and Reminiscences 8 (2001) (“Some of the evils 
against which Marshall railed are safely interred in American history.  One of these is the ghastly 
phenomenon of lynching—murder perpetrated by a group to punish people for perceived 
violations of law or custom.  Between the 1880s and the 1930s, particularly in the South, white 
supremacists deployed lynching as a weapon of racial intimidation.”). 
143  He is not alone among originalists in applying a particularly brutal approach to 
constitutional law.  See Corey Robin, The Enigma of Clarence Thomas 15 (2019) (“[Justice] 
Thomas’s is a voice that unsettles.  His beliefs are disturbing, even ugly; his style is brutal.”).  For 
a compelling analysis of the connection between original constitutional practice and devastating 
modern governmental human rights abuses, see Jamal Greene & Elora Mukherjee, What Slavery 
Can Teach Supreme Court Justices About DACA, L.A. Times, (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/
opinion/story/2019-11-13/daca-supreme-court-slavery-constitution [https://perma.cc/E4VW-
LE2Q] (drawing analogy between antebellum slave capture and the detention of children by U.S. 
Homeland Security officials). 
144  See Delbanco, supra note 8, at 11 (“It begins with the nation’s founding because the founding 
fathers themselves were inextricably bound up in it.  It has a large and varied cast of characters, 
starting with such architects of the Republic as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and 
Benjamin Franklin as well as Washington and Jefferson.”); see also Paul Finkelman, Slavery and 
the Founders 3–35 (2014) (tracking the history of the United States Constitution to the desire to 
perpetuate slavery as a legal practice with political benefits to the American South). 
145  See Klarman, supra note 70, at 264 (describing how slavery played an “enormous role” in the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention). 
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the stage for the expansion of slavery146 and the failure of our political system to 
eliminate slavery through political means.147    
The root and branch of the American history of slavery is a study in human 
devastation.  According to one account: “British formed settlements in North 
America, and in the West Indies; and these were stocked with slaves.  From 1680 to 
1786, two million, one hundred and thirty thousand negroes were imported into the 
British colonies!”148  The means by which slaves were imported into the colonies 
constituted the very height of ignominy.149  The number of African slaves would rise 
to 12.5 million by some accounts.150 
As the United States developed out of the Revolution, and moved toward the 
adoption of the original Constitution, slavery dug itself even deeper into on 
American soil.  A generation of great political leaders whose views, according to 
originalists (like Wurman) we would be bound to follow in 2020, would have been 
expected to remedy, rather than extend, what we would now call crimes against 
humanity.151  That did not happen. 
 
146  See id. at 302–03 (“The best evidence of how contemporaries viewed the Constitution with 
regard to slavery lies . . . in what was not said.  In South Carolina and Georgia, which were the 
states most strongly committed to the indefinite perpetuation of slavery, very few voices criticized 
the Constitution as insufficiently protective of the institution.”). 
147  See Delbanco, supra note 8, at 2 (“This book tells the story of how that composite nation came 
apart.  There were many reasons for the unraveling, but one in particular exposed the idea of the 
“united” states as a lie.  This was the fact that enslaved black people, against long odds, repeatedly 
risked their lives to flee their masters in the South in search of freedom in the North.  Fugitives 
from slavery ripped open the screen behind which America tried to conceal the reality of life for 
black Americans, most of whom lived in the South, out of sight and out of mind for most people 
in the North.”).  The problem of American slavery was simply too difficult for the pre-Civil War 
generation to solve.  See id. at 10 (“‘Humanity cries out against this vast enormity,’ Herman Melville 
wrote in 1849, ‘but not one man knows a prudent remedy.’”). 
148  Lydia Maria Child, An Appeal in Favor of that Class of Americans Called Africans 3 
(1833). 
149  Id. at 4 (“Houses are broken open in the night, and defenseless women and children carried 
away into captivity.  If boys, in the unsuspecting innocence of youth, come near the white man’s 
ships, to sell vegetables or fruit, they are ruthlessly seized and carried to slavery in a distant land.”). 
150  See Andres Resendez, The Other Slavery 5 (2016); see also Foner, supra note 33, at 1–2 
(“There were a little under four million slaves . . . in the United States in 1860” and describing the 
dominance of slavers among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787). 
151  Cf. Hannah Natanson, Two Centuries Ago, University of Virginia Students Beat and Raped Enslaved 
Servants, Historians Say, Wash. Post. (Oct. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/
2019/10/06/two-centuries-ago-university-virginia-students-beat-raped-enslaved-servants-
historians-say/ [https://perma.cc/BF2A-VWWN]. 
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Instead, the founding generation built into the original constitution 
protections by which slave owners could enter free states and steal human beings 
back into bondage; a compromise that was “an abject appeasement of the South by 
the North.”152  The outgrowth of this appeasement was a system by which these 
thefts could be accomplished with no due process and through the most brutal and 
inhumane means.153  That system accommodated efforts within the United States 
Congress to suppress discussion of freedom on the floor of the United States House 
of Representatives through waves of violent threats and bullying by pro-slave forces 
against abolitionists.154  It drove the country into a devastating Civil War.155   
 
152  See Delbanco, supra note 8, at 7. 
153  See id. (describing the Fugitive Slave Act, the statute designed to enforce the fugitive slave 
clause of the United States Constitution, as “an act without mercy.  To those arrested under its 
authority, it denied the most basic right enshrined in the Anglo-American legal tradition—habeas 
corpus—the right to challenge, in open court, the legality of their detention.  It forbade 
defendants to testify in their own defense.  It ruled out trial by jury.   Except for proof of freedom 
such as emancipation papers signed by a former owner, the Fugitive Slave Act disallowed all forms 
of exonerating evidence, including evidence of beatings, rape, or other forms of abuse while the 
defendant had been enslaved.”); see also Mitch Landrieu, In the Shadow of Statues: A White 
Southerner Confronts History 48–49 (2018) (“I was barely twenty when I visited Auschwitz.  
I clearly remember the suitcases stacked high bearing the names of people gassed to death, men 
and women and children who never knew their meager belongings would one day signify their 
lives.  The mounds of hair, hairbrushes, false teeth, prosthetics, the stacks of eyeglasses, they 
carried a moral weight heavier than anything I had ever felt.  To read about the Holocaust from 
afar is to get a grasp of history and that unspeakable horror.  It also allows denial to creep in—
That was then, this is now.  It is not us.  This can never happen in the United States . . . And then the 
realization came that we had done something like this in America with slavery.   The systematic 
evil of Nazism was the closest thing to the Southern society that relied on slave labor.  I was torn 
by the connection between these two realities of history, different in time and place, but with a 
common root, a warped sense that some people are superior to others, a supremacy trapped in its 
own frozen heart.”). 
154  See Joanne B. Freeman, The Field of Blood 113–15 (2018) (describing the congressional 
implementation of a gag rule in 1837 prohibiting members of Congress from advocating for 
abolition and freedom). 
155  It continues to be remarkable that scholars like Wurman trumpet the original constitutional 
government without concerning themselves with the fact that the same government could not 
prevent the American Civil War, the most violent conflict in terms of the lost of American lives in 
the history of the country.  See Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering xi (2008) (“The 
number of solders who died between 1861 and 1865, an estimated 620,000, is approximately equal 
to the total American fatalities in the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-
American War, World War I, World War II, and the Korean War combined.  The Civil War’s rate 
of death, its incidence in comparison to the size of the American population, was six times that of 
World War II.  A similar rate, about 2 percent, in the United States today would mean six million 
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It could not assure a peaceful resolution of a central moral conflict for the 
nation with only one defensible moral solution:  emancipation.156  It produced 
politicians at the highest levels who advocated for the worst kinds of violence and 
barbarity in defense of slavery.157  It is a blight on our history that compares with the 
Holocaust.158 
This was not the only evil perpetrated by early Americans.  Americans 
aggressively pursued a policy of forced removal of Native Americans.159  The same 
 
fatalities.”). 
156  See Rakove, supra note 32, at 58 (“The second compromise, which enabled southern states to 
count three-fifths of their slaves for purposes of representation in the House, is more difficult to 
endorse, much less celebrate.  Scholars still debate whether the success of the Convention 
required so abject an acknowledgement of the brutal reality of chattel slavery; nor can we avoid 
wondering whether the framers’ failure to act against slavery doomed their deepest aspirations 
for a more perfect Union to the horror of civil war.”); Lewis, supra note 13, at 329 (“In the end, Chief 
Justice Marshall  and his contemporaries were simply unable to exert the moral strength to 
overcome the greatest moral travesty of their time.”) (footnote and citations omitted). 
157  Dahl, supra note 115, at 16 (“That it took three-quarters of a century and a sanguinary civil 
war before slavery was abolished should at least make us doubt whether the document of the 
Framers out to be regarded as a holy writ.”); see also Allen W. Trelease, White Terror xli (“Men 
of every station sanctioned lynch law when it suited their purpose.  Jefferson Davis once told a 
New York audience that Northern politicians who proclaimed a higher law than the Constitution, 
condemning slavery on moral grounds, ‘should be tarred and feathered, and whipped . . . . The 
man who . . . preaches treason to the Constitution and the dictates of all human society, is a fit 
object for a Lynch law that would be higher than any he could urge.”). 
158  See Neiman, supra note 9, at 28–29 (2019) (“Germans were not the only ones to compare their 
own racist crimes with those of others.  In the early ‘60s, before the Holocaust became sacrosanct, 
many African Americans did so too.  When W.E.B. Dubois visited the Warsaw ghetto in 1949, he 
was shaken by the parallels he drew with what he’d called the century’s greatest problem, the color 
line . . . . Tellingly, no African American I met while researching this book found the comparison 
problematic.”); see also Michael Gorra, A Heritage of Evil, N.Y. Rev. of Books at 11 (Nov. 7, 2019) 
(“W.E.B. Du Bois saw a parallel between the color line and the Warsaw ghetto, and Ta-Nehisi 
Coates has recently suggested that the reparations Germany paid to Israel in the early 1950s might 
serve as a model for this country.  Bryan Stevenson of the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, 
Alabama, has been explicit in appealing to the example of Germany as a way to understand our 
own history of systemic racism . . . ”); Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the 
Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 429, 453–54 (1998) (analogizing the case for reparations 
to the European Jewish community to the case for reparations for the descendants of African 
slaves in the United States). 
159  See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
431, 434 (2005) (“De Tocqueville . . . saw the dark side of this nation-building, however: ‘The 
expulsion of the Indian often takes place at the present day in a regular and, as it were, a legal 
manner, involving great evils . . . [that] appear to me to be irremediable.’”) (citation and footnotes 
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generation of drafters and ratifiers were committed to the wholesale subjugation of 
women and countenanced violence against women as the virtually unrestricted 
province of men.160  Women had no status under the Constitution of 1789 and no 
power whatsoever to influence its provisions.161  Children had no independent legal 
status.162  Most people in the United States did not have the right to vote.  There was 
no Bill of Rights protecting free speech or privacy, including in one’s home.  Life 
expectancies were short.163  Literacy rates were low by comparison to today.164   
Wide-spread public education was almost non-existent by contemporary 
 
omitted). 
160  See Katherine M. Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and Rationales for Spousal 
Battering, Marital Rape and Stalking, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 79, 88–91 (1994) (describing Early American 
views toward women and their legal rights); see also Angela Dodson, Remember the Ladies 31 
(2017) (describing degraded legal status of women in Early America). 
161  See Mary Beth Norton, The Constitutional Status of Women in 1787, 6 Law & Ineq. 7, 7 (1988) (“I 
am tempted to make this presentation on the constitutional status of women in 1787 extremely 
brief.  That is, I could accurately declare that ‘women had no status in the Constitution of 1787’ 
and immediately sit down and to listen to the comments of the rest of the panelists here this 
morning.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 465, 465 (1995) 
(“In the 1780s, the United States Constitution was ordained and established by men.  As a rule, 
women did not participate in the conventions that framed and ratified the Constitution.  Women 
did not vote for convention delegates.  And women—as women—did not publicly participate in 
constitutional debates in the press, in pamphlets, and so on.”); see also Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the Constitution, 6 Law & Ineq. 17, 18 (1988) (“Women’s status 
under the law continued largely unaltered at the Constitution’s centennial 100 years ago.  In 1887, 
women were still thirty-three years away from securing the right to vote.  And the fourteenth 
amendment, added to the Constitution in 1868, despite its grandly general, growth-susceptible 
equal protection clause, did not inspire feminists of that day.  Rather, the amendment alarmed 
them; for its second section added to the Constitution for the very first time the world ‘male,’ and 
linked that word to ‘citizens.’”) (footnote and citation omitted). 
162  See supra note 26. 
163  See Max Roser, Twice as long – life expectancy around the world, Our World in Data (Oct. 8, 
2018) https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy-globally [https://perma.cc/84YV-3UD2] 
(“Demographic research suggests that at the beginning of the 19th century no country in the world 
had a life expectancy over 40 years . . . . Almost everyone lived in extreme poverty, we had very 
little medical knowledge or understanding of disease burden, and in all countries our ancestors 
had to prepare for an early death.”).  
164  See National Center for Education Statistics, 120 Years of American Education: A 
Statistical Portrait (1993) at 9, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93442.pdf [https://perma.cc/J34J-
826M] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020) (describing increased functional literary through the 20th 
century). 
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measures.165  Education, generally, at the most basic levels, was reserved for the 
smallest segments of American society and excluded women.166  This was not a good 
time for most people.167    
The framers, themselves, recognized the nature of the human condition in 
which they lived, and their conclusions reflected an absence of faith in their own 
goodness.  Madison’s defense of constitutional government, famously, 
acknowledged the need for the government he proposed to be a reflection of 
realities regarding human nature.168  Men, as he knew them, were not angels.169  
Madison’s absence of faith in human nature caused him to build a government with 
structures he believed would counteract those evils.170  The evils of his own 
generation were manifest and known to his contemporaries.171 
Far from grounding a constitutional methodology in the perspective of a 
generation whose notions of justice were immoral and unjust (as Madison did on 
 
165  See Grace Chen, A Relevant History of Public Education in the United States, Pub. Sch. Rev. (Dec. 
7, 2018), https://www.publicschoolreview.com/blog/a-relevant-history-of-public-education-in-
the-united-states [https://perma.cc/CCX6-TY4Z] (“After the Revolutionary War, Thomas 
Jefferson argued that there should be a formal education system, and taxpayer dollars should be 
used to support it.  However . . . that request went unheeded for nearly a century.”). 
166  See American Public Education:  An Origin Story, Educ. News (Apr. 16, 2013), 
https://www.educationnews.org/education-policy-and-politics/american-public-education-an-
origin-story/ [https://perma.cc/M4MQ-5LKH] (describing public education in American before 
the 19th Century); see also James Carpenter, Thomas Jefferson and the Ideology of Democratic Schooling, 
21 Democracy and Educ. 1, 7 (2013) (“First, while valuing the people as guardiancies of personal 
liberty, Jefferson also saw a social hierarchy that precluded equality of status.”). 
167  Foner, supra note 33, at 5–6 (2019) (“As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, a passion for equality 
animated American democracy.  But the concept of equality before the law—something enjoyed 
by all persons regardless of social status—barely existed before the Civil War.”). 
168  The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) (“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such 
devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.  But what is government, itself, 
but the great of reflections on human nature?  If men were angles, no government would be 
necessary?”). 
169  Id. 
170  Id. (“A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but 
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”). 
171   William Voegeli, Left, Right, and Human, 14 Claremont Rev. of Books 12, 13 (Oct. 30, 2014), 
https://www.claremont.org/crb/article/left-right-and-human/ [https://perma.cc/Q6R3-2LQJ] 
(Ascribing to Madison a view of humans that as “dangerous[ly] selfish”).  Madison, himself, was 
no angel.  See Klarman, supra note 70, at 264 (“Madison owned nine slaves (and would inherit 
more than a hundred upon his father’s death in 1801)” and he “[rejected) a plea in 1791 that he 
support a gradual emancipation scheme in Virginia”). 
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other grounds), this record challenges whether we would ever be justified in 
importing such a perspective, wholesale, into our approach to constitutional law 
today if we have, as we do, the choice not to do so.172  Put another way, this record 
should cause us to ask whether we should import only the best aspects of that 
perspective into our interpretations of the law, while protecting our constitutional 
law from threats that an exclusively backward looking interpretive methodology 
could, or would, extend the evils of our history from the past into the future.   
Given what we know about the past, this review proposes that the perspective 
of the founding generation should go to great lengths to prove that it is worthy of 
our obedience today to the extent that it is proposed to the exclusion of all other 
perspectives.173  An originalist approach, like the one depicted by Justice Gorsuch, 
which appears to embrace a stomach-turning account of a cruel past to justify 
cruelty as a matter of law, would not meet this standard.  This review proposes that 
protecting the Constitution from this flawed approach may be accomplished 
through a canon of constitutional interpretation.  This canon would serve 
prescriptive purposes that are methodologically consistent with the character of 
other approaches to constitutional interpretation presented by scholars-past.174  As 
scholars have noted, the United States Supreme Court relies upon canons to enforce 
policy values it reads into the Constitution where constitutional tensions arise.175  
Canons of construction are, and have been, a part of the “interpretive regime” of  
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence throughout its history.176    
Such a regime can include “clear statement rules” and “presumptions” designed 
 
172  Cf. Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism for the Twenty-First Century, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 383, 397 (2007) (“Some advocates of originalism are revisionist when it comes to 
acknowledging the significance of the slavery-protective features of the original Constitution.  
Fearful of ever inviting natural law to override text, these writers fail, in my judgment, to 
appreciate the revolutionary insult that slavery was to humanity.”). 
173  See Baude, supra note 112, at 6 (“But history, it has been wisely observed, is neither self-
interpreting nor self-enforcing.  Rather, constructing precedents and principles out of historical 
events requires a framework to tell us which events are relevant and why.  In the context of judicial 
precedent, such frameworks are ubiquitous, widely taught, and widely studied.”). 
174  See Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1325, 1337–39 (2018) 
(describing prescriptive approaches to interpretation as guiding official conduct, separate and 
apart from the approach of determining what the constitution, in fact, means). 
175  See William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
26, 81 (1994) (“One way in which the Court can appropriately perform its stabilizing role is to apply 
clear statement canons to prevent congressional enactment from unnecessarily traversing 
constitutional values.”). 
176  Id. at 66. 
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to implement substantive policies.177  The United States Supreme Court has even 
designed “super-strong clear statement rules” to protect “constitutional values that 
are virtually never enforced through constitutional interpretation” — otherwise 
known as “underenforced constitutional norms.”178  At one point in the Court’s 
history, the Court deployed these devices to protect the interests of African 
Americans, a class recognized as meeting the definition of a group in need of 
judicial protection, within the Carolene Products case.179  At an earlier point in history, 
Chief Justice John Marshall deployed canons of construction to buttress the 
sovereignty of Native American tribes against the full-brunt of “might makes right” 
colonial force.180  To the extent that originalists and others claim that accurate 
American history supplies a basis for determining the content of our laws, the canon 
this review proposes will ensure that the underenforced constitutional norm of 
principled, historical accuracy is given constitutional status in the face of the 
mountains of unqualified praise heaped upon the founding generation by 
originalists and non-originalists, alike.181  It also provides a legal mechanism that 
 
177  See id. at 68; see also William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596–97 (1992) (“That is, unlike the 
linguistic canons or the referential canons, the substantive canons are not policy neutral.  They 
represent value choices by the Court.”). 
178  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 177, at 597. 
179  See id. at 612 (discussing the “Carolene canon”). 
180  See Frickey, supra note 34, at 412 (“In both McCulloch and Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall went 
to great lengths to immunize a constitutive document from a construction that would violate its 
purposes.  As explained below, he essentially created a clear-statement rule of interpretation, 
under which only crystal-clear text could trump the spirit of the document under 
construction . . . Worcester . . . refused to read the ninth article of the Treaty of Hopewell to ‘convert 
a treaty of peace covertly into an act, annihilating the political existence of one of the parties.’”); 
see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and Presumptions in Indian 
and American Law, 47 Amer. J. of Comp. L. 89 (1999) (describing use of presumptions to provide 
special protections to Indian women under threat of dowry death). 
181   The roots of this problem run deep and reach back into the American childhood.  See Joe 
Heim, Teaching America’s Truth, Wash. Post. (Aug. 28, 2019),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/
education/2019/08/28/teaching-slavery-schools/ [https://perma.cc/7555-7U3L] (describing the 
failure of the American school curriculum to teach the topic of American slavery in public schools); 
see also NEIMAN, supra note 9, at 34–35 (“Until this becomes the kind of knowledge that is mandatory 
in our classrooms and visible to our public spaces, we’ll continue to hear the refrain: Slavery ended 
in the nineteenth century, why are we still talking about it in the twenty-first?”).  For specific instances of 
the effects, see Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1145, 1146–47 (2001) (“The electoral college is of course based in part on the three fifths clause.  Thus 
there is an immediate connection between slavery and the electoral college . . . This lack of 
discussion of slavery by scholars of the electoral college is surprising, because the records of the 
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would undo deep distortions in descriptions of American history182 that can be 
traced to the institutional distortion and suppression of truth.183 
The canon this review proposes as a means of protecting our constitutional law 
from our evil history could be phrased as follows:   Evidence or arguments 
consistent with an originalist methodology will be viewed as presumptively tied to 
our evil past unless the proponents of originalism are able to clearly demonstrate 
otherwise.  In the absence of such a showing, the Court shall deploy non-originalist 
approaches to resolving constitutional questions so as to mitigate the possibility 
that the evils of [choose one or more of the following: slavery, the subjugation of 
women, the annihilation of Native Americans, the dehumanization of children]184 
shall influence the definition or applications of our fundamental laws. 
What would be the effect of such a canon?  When considering how to interpret 
“interstate commerce” or what is “necessary and proper” from the standpoint of 
Article I jurisprudence, such a canon would not capitulate to evidence from a 
generation that trafficked in human lives and viewed women as a political subclass 
(at best) unable to engage, fully, as commercial actors.185  Instead, the originalism 
perspective must prove that it should influence a modern construction of our laws 
 
Convention show that in fact the connection between slavery and the college was deliberate, and 
very much on the minds of many delegates, including James Madison.”). 
182  See Loewen, supra note 16, at xix (“Decades ago, in Mississippi, I learned that history can be 
a weapon.  It had been used against my students, to keep them in ‘their place’ . . . . When I moved 
to Vermont, I came to see that false history was a national problem, not just a southern one.  
Mississippi exemplified the problem in more extreme form, but the problem was national.”). 
183  Foner, supra note 33, at xxiii–xxiv (discussing the entrenchment of the Dunning School in 
Supreme Court decisions that narrowed and frustrated the aims of the reconstruction 
amendments and continue to do so to this day); see Eve Fairbanks, The ‘Reasonable Rebels’, Wash. 
Post. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/29/conservatives-say-
weve-abandoned-reason-civility-old-south-said-that-too/ [https://perma.cc/9B2J-AT8V] (“One 
reason slavery was not abolished in America through the political process, as it was in Britain, is 
that abolitionists were rhetorically straitjacketed by the proposition that they were the hard-liners 
who sought to curtail freedom.”); see also Erna Paris,  Long Shadows: Truth, Lies and History 
170 (2002) (describing the national, ideological fault line between our proclaimed principles and 
our history of slavery). 
184  See Lessig, supra note 5, at 353 (“This much is clear: America at the turn of the nineteenth 
century was not a nation that embraced a rich sense of social equality.  Everyone recognizes the 
wrongs done to blacks.  But we are less likely to remember the wrongs done to Jews, or Native 
Americans, or Irish, or Chinese.”). 
185  Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616–17 (2000) (relying upon “the Framers” 
perspective on interstate commerce to invalidate aspects of the Violence Against Women’s Act). 
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without entrenching or reifying principles from evil history.186    
When considering the meaning of “due process,” such a canon would not accept 
a view of what is “due” as “process” from government in regard to the deprivation 
of life, liberty and property, if that “due process” concept depended upon, and 
furthered, the perspective of the intent and mindset underlying the fugitive slave 
clause of the United States Constitution.187  That mindset conceived of deprivations 
of life, liberty, and property with very little, if any, process the United States 
provided to the humans who lost everything to a system of barbarity.188  In applying 
“substantive due process” to questions regarding the right to an abortion, public 
meaning from a generation that had a vastly different view of the human rights of 
women than what is acceptable to us, now, would have to overcome this anti-
originalist canon.189  The same is true with respect to the rights of children and 
whether the state may fail to prevent or mitigate the effects of obvious child abuse 
 
186  Neiman, supra note 9, at 31 (“Until very recently, the amount of material about the darker 
sides of American history has been far easier to look.  The information was there, but it took work 
to seek it out.  Once confined to university libraries and departments of African American or 
postcolonial studies, the history of slavery and the Jim Crow reign of terror are now part of general 
history curricula and popular culture.”); see id. at 34 (“There are several reasons for American 
slowness in facing our history, and one is fairly simple: there’s a hundred-year hole in it, and few 
white Americans are even aware of that.”) and id. at 35(“There are sinister explanations for the 
presence of this hole in American memory, beginning with the defenders of the Lost Cause 
narrative of Confederate history, but one explanation is perfectly innocent: Americans prefer 
narratives of progress.”).  
187  See Klarman, supra note 70, at 301 (“Many southern supporters of the Constitution shared 
the view that it was strongly proslavery—but they extolled it for this reason.  One of their 
arguments was that the Constitution secured southerners, as Charles Cotesworth Pinckney 
explained in South Carolina, ‘a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of American they may 
take refuge, which is a right we had not before.’  Madison made the same point at the Virginia 
ratifying convention—that the Constitution was a clear improvement upon the Articles in this 
regard.”) (footnote and citation omitted). 
188  See Greene, supra note 40, at 519 (“The Constitution included two other direct 
accommodations for slavery:  the Fugitive Slave Clause, which required states to return any 
escaped slaves and which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, prevented states from affording 
due process to their black citizens who were accused of being fugitive slaves.”) (footnote and 
citation omitted). 
189  Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291, 291 (2007) 
(“Criticisms of Roe have generally proceeded precisely on this ground: the right to sexual privacy 
is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, and there is no evidence that the framers and 
adopters of the 1787 Constitution or of any later amendments expected or intended the 
Constitution to protect a woman’s right to abortion.”). 
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that the state has committed to preventing as a matter of law.190  Original notions 
of due process from a generation that did not view children as anything more than 
property would be viewed with deep, legal skepticism.  
The effects would not end there.  When determining the scope of “equal 
protection” under the Fourteenth Amendment, the “closed-mindedness” of 
constitutional draftsmen to the long-standing legal subversion of half of the 
population would face substantial hurdles when offered as evidence regarding the 
content of our constitutional law.191  When considering what sorts of punishments 
are “cruel” under the Eighth Amendment, judges could not default to the original 
public meaning of “cruelty” held by a generation of slavers who traded in human 
lives and, as Gorsuch notes, permitted undifferentiated capital punishment for all 
forms of crimes.192   
 The application of this canon would exclude or, at least limit, the callous, cruel, 
and inhumane perspectives of evildoers who accomplished evil ends, and held evil 
views, in 1789.  No version of the Constitution provides, and so no version 
demands, that Americans and their officials reject this approach.193  No version of 
the Constitution even prescribes an interpretive key or road map, and no 
generation since the founding has ratified one.194  And of course, no court has ever 
 
190  Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“But nothing in the language of the Due 
Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens 
against invasion by private actors.  The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power not 
to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal standards of safety and security . . . [I]ts language 
cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those 
interests do not come to harm through other means.  Nor does history support such an expansive 
reading of the constitutional text.”). 
191  Cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566–67 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Much of the 
Court’s opinion is devoted to deprecating the closed-mindedness of our forebears with regard to 
women’s education, and even with regard to the treatment of women in areas that have nothing 
to do with education.  Closed-minded they were—as every age is, including our own, with regard 
to matters it cannot guess, because it simply does not consider them debatable.”). 
192  See, e.g., Greene, supra note 188; Bucklew, supra note 3. 
193  See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution x (2012) (“Since the written 
Constitution does not come with a complete set of instructions about how it should be construed, 
we must go beyond the text to make sense of the text.”). 
194  See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2092 (2018) (“Each year, the physical 
presence rule becomes further removed from economic reality and results in significant revenue 
losses to the States.  These critiques underscore that the physical presence rule, both as first 
formulated and as applied today, is an incorrect interpretation of the Commerce Clause.”); 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 877 (2009) (“As new problems have emerged 
that were not discussed at common law, however, the Court has identified additional instances 
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adopted originalism as its primary or exclusive constitutional methodology in 
major cases regarding the relationship between the government and the law.195  
Opponents of this canon therefore cannot claim that it is explicitly proscribed with 
reference to the text of the constitution or by an since, interpretive methodology 
other than originalism. 
The canon serves important discursive ends as well,196 and is a response to the 
undifferentiated deference to historical perspective originalism demands, while 
 
which, as an objective matter, require recusal.   These are circumstances in which experience 
reaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to 
be constitutionally tolerable.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to 
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“These decisions underscore the truism that due 
process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place and circumstances . . . . Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973) (plurality decision relies upon changed legal 
framework recognizing and regulating gender discrimination to conclude that “we can only 
conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based on race . . . must . . . be 
subject to strict judicial scrutiny.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (evolving 
nature of commerce resulted in changes to due process standards with regard to personal 
jurisdiction). 
195  See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2352, 2376–86 (2015) 
(describing numerous, landmark cases, in which originalism was not the law, including cases 
recognizing rights against discrimination on the basis of race and sex, establishing the right to 
appointed counsel and establishing a series of rights that fall under the penumbra of the right to 
privacy); Ginsburg, supra note 161, at 17 (“We still have, cherish, and live under our eighteenth 
century Constitution because, through a combination of three factors or forces—hange in 
society’s practices, constitutional amendment, and judicial interpretation—a broadened system 
of participatory has evolved, one in which we take pride.”); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 217, 279–80 (2004) 
(surveying reliance on original meaning evidence and finding uses to be “indeterminate”); David 
A. Strauss, Do We Have a Living Constitution?, 59 Drake L. Rev. 973, 973 (2011) (“One of the most 
fundamental facts about American constitutional law is that it changes.”) (documenting the 
history in case law); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (“The Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and 
effects.”) (quotation omitted); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to 
render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person.   
Hence, his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was a prerequisite to its rendition 
of a judgment personally binding him.”) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)). 
196  See Baude, supra note 195, at 2376–86; Ginsburg, supra note 161, at 17; Peter J. Smith, Sources of 
Federalism, supra note 195, at 279–80; Strauss, supra note 195, at 973; see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 
2094; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
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refusing to scrap the perspective of the founding generation altogether.  It would 
require courts to examine, honestly and completely, statements about history that 
deny the full extent of our history, and so threaten to import assumptions about the 
human experience into a reading of the law that are not grounded in reality.197  In 
this respect, it creates a legal mechanism that requires our laws and procedures to 
confront and promote truth in litigation, including difficult truths about ourselves 
and our national past. 
C ONC L US I ON 
Regardless of whether any specific remedy is deployed to force our country, our 
courts, and other legal officials with power, to internalize our evil history as part of 
an official constitutional record, the three books under review operate as if that 
history plays no role (or very little role in Segall’s case) in discussions over 
originalism.  The result is a distorted discussion of American history that cannot 
answer one of its great and most accomplished critics: Justice Marshall.  That such 
a discussion could, or would, occur given all that we know about our history 
suggests that the assessment of originalism would otherwise persist in this fashion, 
including at the highest levels of our judiciary, and that canons such as the one 
suggested in this review are appropriate to ensure the proper relationship between 
 
197  This approach does not resolve disputes between positivists and antipositivists and other 
schools of thought and does not need to.  See Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 
YALE L.J. 1288, 1297–1301 (2014) (describing the Standard Picture and other approaches to 
conceptualizing law).  It is, and this author is, sympathetic to the position that “it is essential to 
legal systems that they are supposed to improve the moral situation” while expressing 
(unfortunate) concern about whether all legal systems must do so to be legal systems.  Id. at 1324.  
Nevertheless, my position assumes that the law, specifically American law, is, in fact, conceptually 
able to incorporate the canon proposed here and could do so under positivist and antipositivist 
views of the law.  Compare John Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Right 319 (2d ed. 2011) (“Still, 
the reasons that justify the vast legal effort to render the law, unlike the informal social institution 
of promising, relatively impervious to discretionary assessments of competing values and 
conveniences are reasons that also justify us in asserting that the moral obligation to confirm to 
legal obligations is relatively weighty.”), and Scott Shapiro, Legality at 17 (2011) (describing 
antipositivist views as follows: “The claim that the Nazis did not have law, in other words, is not a 
truistic input to conceptual analysis but rather its theoretical output.  For example, one might feel 
that the only way to account for the fact that legal authorities have the legal right to rule and are 
capable of imposing legal obligations on their subjects compels us to impute moral legitimacy to 
them and hence to deny to wicked regimes such as the Nazis the status of law.”), with H.L.A. Hart, 
The Concept of Law 163 (1997 ed.) (“Laws may be condemned as morally bad simply because they 
require men to do particular actions which morality forbids individuals to do, or because they 
require men to abstain from doing those which are morally obligatory.”). 
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historical truth and judicial methodology. 
